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]
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;

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
In accordance with Rule R410-14-2, Utah Admin. Code (1996), a hearing
requested by Petitioner Hospital was conducted as a formal hearing by the administrative
law judge for the Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing. The
provisions of Chapter 46b of Title 63, Utah Administrative Procedures Act, are applicable
and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(1) (1997) "all final agency action[s]
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings" fall under the jurisdiction of either the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals. In this instance, under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(a) (1997), the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the Division of Health Care Financing [DHCF/Division] correctly
applied its rules governing prior authorization required for all transplantation services for
which payment under the Medicaid program is sought.
2. Whether the agency decision correctly concluded that the Hospital did not
establish each element of equitable estoppel.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Where an issue involves mixed questions of facts and law, the facts found by the
agency are reviewable under a substantial evidence test based upon the record as a whole;
the conclusions reached are reviewable for correctness. Zissi v. State Tax Comm 'n, 842
P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1992). An agency's application of the law to an historical set of
facts may be reviewed by an appellate court applying "varying degrees of strictness,
falling anywhere between a review for 'correctness' and a broad 'abuse of discretion'
standard." Drake v. Industrial Comm 'n. 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997) (citation
omitted); see Peterson v. Utah Dep 7 of Health, 969 P.2d 1, 4-5 (Utah Ct. App. 1998);
Taylor v. Department of Commerce, 952 P.2d 1090, (Utah Ct. App. 1998); cf South
Davis Community Hosp. v. Department of Health, 869 P.2d 979 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (an
agency expressly granted discretion by the Legislature has its decisions reviewed for
reasonableness and rationality.).
An appellate court considering whether equitable estoppel has been proven
reviews this mixed question of fact and law under a correctness standard applying
2

differing degrees of deference. Estoppel is a fact-intensive question and the reviewing
court will grant the decision maker a fair degree of deference. See State v. Inzarry, 945
P.2d 676. 678 (Utah 1997); Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielsen, 886 P.2d 61. 65 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The following relevant provisions are included in Addendum A:
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (1992); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(44)(A) (1992); 42 C.F.R. §
456.1(1995); Utah Code Ann. §§26-18-1 to -402 (1995 & Supp. 1998) (selected
sections); Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1997); Utah Admin. Code R414-2A-600(3)
(1996); Utah Admin. Code R414-10-2(14) (1996); Utah Admin. Code R414-10-5 (1996);
Utah Admin. Code R414-10-7.H (1996); Utah Admin. Code R414-10A-3(10) (1996);
Utah Admin. Code R414-10A-5(5) (1996); and Utah Admin. Code R414-10A-7(1)
(1996).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arose from the Division's denial of Medicaid payment to a provider
hospital. Primary Children's Medical Center, for the Hospital's failure to comply with the
agency's rule requiring prior authorization for all transplantation services to be paid under
the Medicaid program. The only issue before the Administration Law Judge [ALJ] was
the denial of payment for the Hospital's noncompliance with the rule. Matters
concerning medical necessity were not before the ALJ and are not before this Court.
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Through the assistance of the Hospital's resource counselor, the patient, Sean
Daugaard. obtained Medicaid coverage in March 1997 in anticipation of the scheduled
July 1997 bone marrow transplantation. Program access requirements of the Medicaid
program require prior authorization for transplantations. When Sean was admitted to the
Hospital July 8 in anticipation of the transplantation procedures, no prior authorization
request and accompanying documentation had been received by the Division. Sean
remained in the Hospital until his discharge date of September 19, 1997. On that day, the
requesting physician signed the prior authorization request form. The prior authorization
request form and supporting medical documentation were received at DHCF on October
29, 1997. An amended Notice of Denial based upon the Hospital's noncompliance with
program access requirements, specifically prior authorization, was mailed to the Hospital
dated July 23, 1998.
Assessing the evidence, the ALJ determined facts showing the Hospital did not
submit a prior authorization request required by agency rule. Concerning application of
the rule permitting post-transplantation authorization, the evidence presented by the
Hospital did not satisfy the "unusual, emergency circumstances" criteria. The Hospital
raised the issue of equitable estoppel against the Division at the administrative hearing;
but, absent finding "unusual, emergency" circumstances as defined under the posttransplantation authorization rule, this avenue of relief, too, was unavailable.
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Finding that the testimonial evidence and the admitted exhibits did not show the
Hospital had prevailed in its burden of proving the prior authorization had been satisfied
or was inapplicable, the ALJ recommended that the Division's decision denying payment
to the Hospital should be affirmed. The ALJ's Recommended Decision was adopted by
the Division's Director as the Final Agency Order. Addendum B. The Hospital
petitioned for review of that decision resulting from the formal administrative hearing.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 8, 1997, Sean Daugaard, a child scheduled for bone marrow
transplantation, was admitted to Primary Children's Medical Center. [Tr. at 19-20.]
Earlier that year, the Hospital's resource counselor, Mr. Richard Bryan Fairbourn,
assisted Sean's family in obtaining financial assistance for the costs of the
transplantation. [Tr. at 20.] Mr. Fairbourn's employment duties entailed working with
patients and their families to determine what financial or insurance resources existed.
[Tr. at 35.] His testimony showed he knew there was no private insurance coverage for
the transplantation. [Tr. at 68.] In Sean^s case, he assisted the family and Medicaid
eligibility was established March 1, 1997. Mr. Fairbourn's testimony reflected that he
was only aware of Medicaid coverage and that was his primary responsibility. [Tr. at
68.] Records admitted at the hearing below and witness testimony established that
Medicaid eligibility continued uneventfully until July. [Tr. at 21, 35; R. at 105, 107,
110.]
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Mr. Fairbourn reviewed the state's Medicaid status information system available to
him at the Hospital on July 9, 1997, and observed no eligibility on Sean. [Tr. at 21.]
This prompted him to go see Ms. Debbie Lucero, a state employee physically housed at
the Hospital. Testimony from the administrative hearing of Mr. Fairbounf s account of
that conversation with Ms. Lucero, as well as his testimony about his own thoughts and
actions at the time, established that: (1) he knew Sean had Medicaid eligibility beginning
in March; (2) he queried Ms. Lucero why; Sean had been covered up until then, but now
the computer information showed no eligibility; (3) Ms. Lucero looked at the computer
system and indicated it was time for review and that no medical card had been issued for
July and a new application would be needed to re-establish eligibility; and (4) Mr.
Fairbourn went directly to Sean's hospital room, met with Sean's mother who filled in
and signed the new application which Mr. Fairbourn then gave to Ms. Lucero. [Tr. at 2122.] Mr. Fairbourn then entered a status notation of "pending Medicaid," referencing the
application just delivered to Ms. Lucero. [Tr. at 27.]
The next time Mr. Fairbourn took any action concerning Sean's status was August
1, 1997; that was the date for his routine review of accounts. Sean's Medicaid eligibility
was in effect for July and August. [Tr. at 23.]
Mr. Fairbourn testified he was aware of prior authorization requirements imposed
by other insurance funds; he would contact them to make sure the Hospital complied with
the requirements. [Tr. at 38.] He placed his notations about patients' eligibility in the
Hospital's computer system for others who may need to know. [Tr. at 40-41.]
6

At the August 1998 hearing, Ms. Bernadette McNally, one of the bone marrow
transplant program managers and coordinators for the Hospital testified she had been
with the Hospital in that position for one year. [Tr. at 71.] Her duties involved seeking
prior authorization for bone marrow transplantation services for patients entering the
hospital. [Tr. at 69.] She, however, did not have responsibility for Sean's case. [Tr. at
73.] She testified that during the time she had been with the Hospital, she had submitted
to Medicaid two prior authorization request forms for bone marrow transplantations. In
each case the Medicaid eligibility was in place. [Tr. at 71.]
The Division's exhibits reflecting the action on Sean's Medicaid status and critical
dates with respect to the hospitalization and transplantation services were acknowledged
and accepted as business records by the Hospital, [Tr. at 46, 66], and admitted by the
Administrative Law Judge at the hearing. [Tr. at 66, 85.] These admitted business
records showed dates of the Medicaid coverage beginning in March 1997, [R. at 105];
review and reauthorization for a medical card July 9, 1997, [R. at 107]; the dates of
hospitalization and service for transplantation, which was July 17, 1997, [R. at 63; Tr. at
82]; and the request for prior authorization from the Hospital dated September 19, 1997,
[R. at 64], which was received by the Division October 29, 1997. [R. at 112.]
Based upon the events transpiring in this case, the Division denied payment to the
Hospital for its failure to comply with the prior authorization rule governing all
transplantations.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Prior authorization is a precondition to payment for medical transplantation
services. Participating providers operating pursuant to agreement with the Medicaid
program are charged with knowledge of program rules. Nothing the state employee
allegedly said or did waived the requirement imposed upon the Hospital that, as a
participating provider in the Medicaid program, it was required to request prior
authorization. Definitions of services and program access requirements are found in the
Utah Administrative Code. Under the rules applicable to this case, bone marrow
transplantations require prior authorization.
The Hospital's obligation to comply with the program rules places upon it the
responsibility to take the steps necessary to meet the program access requirements. The
Hospital had the means to know of Sean's status, the scheduled dates of service for the
transplantation, and the requirements of participation in the Medicaid program, including
the specific requirement of prior authorization for all transplantations.
The Hospital had the burden to prove it had either met the requirements for prior
authorization or it was legally justified in not meeting those requirements.
Agency rules distinguish between circumstances that are governed by the usual
prior authorization requirements and those rare circumstances that justify application of
rules governing "unusual, emergency circumstances." The rules contain definitions of
"emergency transplantations" and "post-transplantation authorization" as well as program
access requirements relevant to those rare events when prior authorization cannot be
8

accomplished. The events of the instant case do not fit the definitions permitting
application of any rule other than the standard prior authorization rule as applied by the
Division.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel generally is not assertable against the
government for sound, valid reasons. Absent the exception of "unusual circumstances"
being proved by its proponent the general rule governs. The Hospital had the burden of
proving all the elements of estoppel. The record does not contain facts sufficient to meet
this burden as neither a representation nor reasonable reliance on it were shown. In fact,
the Hospital's witnesses professed a lack of specific responsibility for obtaining prior
authorization for Sean's transplantation. Moreover, the Hospital did not prove the
unusual circumstances necessary to meet the exception to the general rule disfavoring
estoppel against the government.
The Division reasonably interpreted and applied the applicable rule governing
prior authorization of transplantation services.
ARGUMENT
I.

PRIOR AUTHORIZATION IS A PRECONDITION TO
PAYMENT FOR TRANSPLANTATION SERVICES
WITH WHICH THE HOSPITAL DID NOT COMPLY.
The single issue set for formal administrative hearing was the denial of Medicaid

payment to the Hospital for its failure to comply with the Medicaid program's
requirement of prior authorization.
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To appreciate this requirement in the program's rules and the Division's
application and enforcement of the rule in this instance, it is helpful to consider the
interrelationship of the Division's rules, statutes and the requirements of the federal-state
program known as the Medicaid program.
The Medicaid program was established by Congress in 1965 when it enacted Title
XIX of the Social Security Act. It is a cooperative federal-state program designed to help
participating states provide medical services to certain needy individuals. Harris v.
McRae. 448 U.S. 297, 301. 100 S.Ct. 2671. 2680 (1980). Through the federal financial
participation, states share the costs of care with the federal government. 42 U.S.C. §
1396 (1992). To receive federal financial participation, participating states must have an
approved State Plan and a single state agency selected to administer the State Plan. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1396a(a)(5)(1992).
Utah is a participating Medicaid state, adopting Utah's Medical Assistance Act in
1981. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-18-1 to -402 (1995 & Supp. 1998). Utah has complete
responsibility for administration of its Medicaid program and has designated the Division
of Health Care Financing, within the Department of Health, as the single administrative
agency for the state. As the designated agency, the Division is responsible for
administering the Medicaid program in accordance with federal and state laws.
The Division has a grant of broad authority from the Legislature. The Division
"shall be responsible for implementing, organizing, and maintaining the Medicaid
Program." Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.1 (1995). The Division is charged with the
10

responsibility for an effective, efficient and economical program. It shall ^'safeguard
against unnecessary or inappropriate use of Medicaid services." Utah Code Ann. § 2618-2.3(1) (1995). It shall "implement and utilize cost-containment methods, where
possible, which may include, but are not limited to: (a) prepayment and postpayment
review systems to determine if utilization is reasonable and necessary; [and] (b)
preadmission certification of nonemergency admissions." Utah Code Ann. § 26-182.3(2)(a),(b)(1995).
To accomplish the legislative directives to implement, organize and maintain the
Medicaid program for Utah, the Division enacted rules to carry out policy consistent with
state law and the requirements of Title XIX and applicable federal regulations. Utah
Code Ann. § 26-18-3 (1995). Rules covering services of physicians and hospitals
provided by agreements are found in the Utah Administrative Code. Therein, program
access requirements and service coverage rules define the conditions for payment.
Inpatient hospital services and physician services related to organ transplantations
require prior authorization. Utah Admin. Code R414-2A-600(3); R414-10-7.H; R41410A-7(1) (1996). Prior authorization safeguards against unnecessary utilization of
services and ensures the treatment and care proposed for the patient meets the level of
care needed. At the time of the initial prior authorization request, the referring physician
must submit, along with the completed prior authorization form, documentation of the
medical condition, prognosis, treatment history and considered alternatives to
transplantation, evaluations of the patient's condition and the family's situation and
11

ability to cope with the pressures, medical evidence to permit evaluation of possible
contraindications, as well as current medical literature documenting the efficacy of the
procedure. Utah Admin. Code R414-10A-7 (1996).
Failure to comply with the prior authorization requirement prevents a review by
the Division charged with administering a cost-effective program required by federal
regulations. Failure to have a utilization review plan in effect renders federal financial
participation unavailable in a state's expenditures for hospital services. 42 C.F.R. §
456.1 (1995).
Prior authorization is just one of the preconditions to reimbursement contained in
the agency's rules for providers. Provider manuals and bulletins describe specific
program policy and program limitations and non-covered services. A general list of
services excluded from coverage is found in the agency's rules. A sample of this listing
reads as follows:
(a) Services rendered during a period the recipient was ineligible for
Medicaid;
(b) Services medically unnecessary or unreasonable;
(c) Services which fail to meet existing standards of professional practice,
or which are currently professionally unacceptable;
(d) Services requiring prior authorization, but for which such
authorization was not received;
(e) Services, elective in nature, based on patient request or individual
preference rather than medical necessity.
Utah Admin. Code R414-10-5 (1996) (emphasis added).
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From the foregoing non-exhaustive list it is apparent "prior authorization'' is part
of a comprehensive utilization control process required of states participating in the joint
federal-state Medicaid program.
Circumstances comparable to those in the present case were presented to this
Court in South Davis Community Hosp. v. Department of Health, 869 P.2d 979 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994). In that case, the Division of Health Care Financing [DHCF] denied
Medicaid payment for patient care provided by South Davis Community Hospital. At
issue was the hospital's failure to comply with the preadmission physician certification
requirement. In the court's analysis of the applicable Division rules and state and federal
laws and regulations, it determined that the action taken by DHCF denying
reimbursement was reasonable and fully consistent with the program's goals to ensure
that payments to providers promote efficient economical and quality care. The court in
South Davis recognized DHCF was required to establish and administer a program
consistent with the federal requirements while ensuring methods and procedures
implementing the program would "safeguard against unnecessary utilization of care and
services by Medicaid providers and to assure that payments to those providers are
consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care." South Davis Community
/7asp.,869P.2dat982.
The patient in South Davis had Medicaid coverage effective August 1, 1989; South
Davis sought reimbursement for the care provided for the period August 1 to October 31,
1989. That application for reimbursement was made December 27, 1989,
13

notwithstanding South Davis had not submitted the preadmission physician certification
required under the applicable administrative rule. The court observed that "under the
applicable DHCF rules, in order to be eligible for Medicaid reimbursement the provider
must first obtain physician certification." Id. at 982. It observed further that the rules
were in place in response to federal regulations requiring implementation of procedures to
guard against unnecessary utilization and to ensure the providers' services were
consistent with a program emphasizing efficient, economical and quality care. Moreover,
"[a]s a central part of this federal utilization review program. Congress has mandated that
whenever a Medicaid patient is admitted to . . . a hospital a physician must certify that
the services being provided to the patient are required because the patient needs such
services. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(44)(A) (1992)." Id.
The court stated that South Davis' noncompliance with the preadmission
certification and the recertification requirements could not be cured by submitting the
necessary documentation after the fact and claiming that Romero "could have been
certified [and therefore it met] the certification requirement." Id. at 983. The court found
that the hospital's reasoning ignored "the fact that DHCF's rules demand
precertification." Id. at 983 (citation omitted). The court further observed:
If South Davis had obtained the necessary physician certification and
recertification and provided the appropriate level of care, as it is currently
doing, DHCF would have reimbursed South Davis, as it is now doing. To
hold that the denial of reimbursement based on one's own inaction amounts
to a forfeiture would emasculate DHCF's requirements, which we have
heretofore determined are reasonable and rational.

14

Id. at 983-84.
This explanation of events and the court's reasoning are applicable to the present
case. It is undisputed the Hospital did not obtain prior authorization. Prior authorization
is a reasonable method of utilization control. The Hospital's inaction in obtaining prior
authorization should not be excused on the basis that prior authorization is a mere
formality.
Similarly, in Mercy Hospital v. Department of Public Welfare, 492 A.2d 104 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1985), the hospital sought reimbursement for acute care it provided to a
patient eligible for medical assistance. The Department of Public Welfare [DPW] denied
reimbursement for the extended period because the patient remained at the acute care
hospital beyond her certified length of stay. The delay in transferring the patient to
another facility was caused by an administrative delay in approving her transfer. A bed
was available but the rehabilitation center would not accept the patient until DPW had
approved the application for transfer to the rehabilitation center. DPW had relied upon
its regulations to deny reimbursement. In finding for DPW, the court referenced the
regulations DPW had relied upon and quoted the relevant provisions as follows:
Except as noted below, Medical Assistance payments are not made to
hospitals either for specific non-covered services and procedures or for
prolonged hospitalization which is not medically justified.
Non-covered services and procedures include:
(q) Patients who no longer require in-patient care
(r) Patients remaining in-house beyond the length of stay certified by the
peer review or utilization review committee of the hospital or the P.S.R.O.
or the Department's P.D.U.R. unit.
15

The above categories of services or procedures are non-compensable to the
hospital and physician under Medical Assistance whether or not the
attending physician or utilization review committee of the hospital or
professional standards review organization determines the medical
necessity for the patient's need for the services.
Mercy Hospital, 492 A.2d at 106.
The court in Mercy found reimbursement was dependent upon compliance with
the regulations. Finding that the agency's interpretation of its own regulations was given
controlling weight, and that the interpretation was not "plainly erroneous, inconsistent
with the regulations, or inconsistent with the underlying federal scheme," Id. at 106 n.3
(citation omitted), the Department's denial of reimbursement was affirmed.
DHCF's requirement of compliance with reimbursement preconditions is not an
aberration of the Utah agency's creation. Preconditions are the norm. In Baptist
Memorial Hospital v. Marsaw, 13 F. Supp. 2d 696 (W.D. Tenn. 1998), the hospital
[BMH] sought payment from Marsaw's Employee Retirement Income Security Act
[ERJSA]-governed benefits plan. Marsaw was admitted to BMH through its emergency
department. In addition to the acute problems occasioning the hospital admittance,
Marsaw suffered from dementia. At admission BMH was informed of Medicare
coverage and coverage provided to retired employees of the Ford Motor Company. The
Ford policy only covered vision and dental. Claims were submitted to Medicare. Over
two years after the initial emergency admission to BMH, the Medicare intermediary
discovered Marsaw had another source of health insurance coverage which had primary
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health coverage benefits, therefore Medicare denied coverage as required by federal law
BMH was not told of the primary payer at this time Several months later the Medicare
intermediary informed BMH of the primary payer's identity BMH immediately
submitted claims to the Bakery and Confectionery Union and Industry International
Health Benefits Fund Payment was denied on the grounds that emergency services were
not certified within 48 hours of admission and the claim for coverage was not submitted
within one year
The court in BMH decided the Fund's Trust Agreement gave the trustees full
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for plan benefits and interpretation of the
plan's terms

Reading the provisions of the plan together, the court concluded the logical

and unambiguous conditions precedent to payment required timely submission of claims
as well as timely post-emergency certification Quoting from a Fund director's statement,
the court explained
The one-year rule aids in long-term planning by enabling the Fund to learn
relatively quickly whether it has large liabilities that may warrant the
establishment of reserves It also minimizes the extent to which the Fund
must pay bad claims due to the inability to properly evaluate their validity
because it enables the Fund to make inquiries, relatively
contemporaneously with the services provided, into such matters as the
consistency of the service provided with the diagnosis and the
appropriateness of the particular service
Baptist Memorial Hospital 13 F Supp 2d at 703-04
Just as the Fund's trustees m BMH had full authority to determine benefits
eligibility and interpret the provisions of the plan, so, too, does DHCF have discretion to
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interpret the provisions governing provider reimbursement. South Davis Community
Hosp., 869 P.2d at 982 n.2. While Utah's Medicaid program is not a benefits fund
created by participating employers like the ERISA fund in BMH, there are some
similarities to note. In fact in the Supreme Court's opinion in Utah County v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985), the discussion of third-party
payers providing sources of revenue to IHC included payments from Medicare and
Medicaid along with private insurers. No distinctions were made among funding sources
whether from patients, private insurance companies or government programs. Mat 274,
278.
The rationale for the provisions applied in BMH, quoted above, is equally
applicable to the prior authorization requirement of the Medicaid program. To fulfill the
mandate of establishing and maintaining an effective, efficient, economical and quality
program, DHCF must be given the opportunity to review the plan of medical services
proposed for a patient before the procedures are completed. Otherwise, no inappropriate,
unnecessary or experimental services could be screened out.
The Hospital argues that prior authorization "has never been applied by the
Agency to withhold reimbursement for 'reasonable and necessary' services to an eligible
recipient." [App. Br. at 13.] The Hospital also argues that "[bjecause the service is
mandated by federal law, (citation omitted), the Agency has no discretion to deny
payment for admittedly appropriate services. [App. Br. at 13.] However, this states too
much.
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First the administrative hearing did not address the issue of "reasonable and
necessary" services. That assessment would have been part of the prior authorization
review conducted by DHCF had it been provided the necessary documentation required
by the prior authorization request. Second, no evidence was presented that the Agency
has never withheld reimbursement for failure to obtain required prior authorization. It is
apparent, however, from South Davis Community Hosp. that reimbursement has, in fact,
been denied for failure to obtain preadmission certification required under the Medicaid
program. Third, since there was no consideration at the administrative hearing of the
medical services provided, there were no admissions by the Division as to
appropriateness of the services rendered. Finally, if the Hospital's position is taken at
face value that the Division has "no discretion" when services are predetermined by the
Hospital to be "reasonable and necessary" and "appropriate," the Division could no
longer require prior authorization. This result would mean utilization control measures
could not be followed.
In addition to the Hospital's claim that prior authorization has never been applied
to the circumstances as characterized by the Hospital, another similar argument lodged is
that the agency acted contrary to prior decisions. This claim, however, is not supported
in the record. The testimony of Ms. McNally that she had submitted two prior
authorization forms for two Medicaid covered patients [Tr. at 71] does not meet the
burden required of a petitioner alleging the agency's action was contrary to prior agency
decisions.
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The Hospital cites to Pickett v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, 858 P.2d 187 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993), in support of its contention that the Division in this case acted contrary to
prior practice. In Pickett, the petitioner, a licensed pharmacist, had his license revoked
for certain violations of dispensing regulations. However, in Pickett the petitioner cited
to ten prior agency decisions in which equally or more egregious violations were alleged
against pharmacists yet the agency's actions "consisted of license suspensions, probation
or a combination of the two, but no license revocations." Id. at 192. In the Hospital's
case, no evidence was presented at the hearing that the Division acted here contrary to
prior agency decisions.
The Hospital cites in vain to a number of cases in support of its position that
"medically necessary" services are mandated by federal law and, thus, failure to obtain
prior authorization is not a valid basis for denial of Medicaid reimbursement. A review
of these cases shows this reliance is not well-founded.
In Laddv. Thomas. 962 F. Supp. 284 (D. Conn. 1997), the court found prior
authorization to be an acceptable means to control utilization by Medicaid recipients. But
more importantly, the prior authorization had been requested', the plaintiffs were
challenging the notice requirements when requests for prior authorization were modified,
denied or granted.
Dodson v. Parham, 427 F. Supp. 97 (1977), concerned Georgia's proposed
restricted drug list for Medicaid reimbursement. A prior approval mechanism for drugs
needed and prescribed but not on the list did not accommodate emergencies, weekends,
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evenings and holidays. Both sides of the controversy recognized varying degrees of
deficiencies of the proposed controlled formulary and prior approval system. Those
deficiencies were apparent to the court, and therefore, the court found the drug list and
prior approval system defective.
Still this case does not present the circumstances which give this Court a basis to
find against the Division's application of the prior authorization rule to the Hospital. In
the instant matter, the Hospital was on notice that all transplantations required prior
authorization and it had ample time beginning in March 1997 when the Hospital
employee helped Sean obtain Medicaid eligibility to submit the prior authorization
request.
Prior authorization was not at issue in McLaughlin v. Williams, 801 F. Supp. 633
(S.D. Fla. 1992). This case discussed the question of a state's authority to refuse
Medicaid funding for certain transplants that it deemed experimental. Whether or not a
procedure is experimental is a matter outside the scope of the question before this Court.
In fact, whether a procedure is experimental or not should be the type of inquiry resolved
during the prior authorization process which the Hospital wants to ignore in this case.
Similarly, Pittman v. Florida Dep 7 of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 998 F.2d
887 (11th Cir. 1993), concerns only the question of discretion by Medicaid-participating
states to not cover transplants. Preconditions to reimbursement to providers were not
discussed or decided.
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Again, m Pereira \ Kozlouski, 996 F 2d 723 (4th Cir 1993), a Medicaid-quahfied
recipient sought Medicaid coverage for an organ transplant which the Department of
Medical Assistance Services for \ lrginia denied on the basis it had discretion to decide
which, if any, organ transplants it would co\er
Which transplantations are covered or non-covered Medicaid services is not the
issue before this Court These cited cases go to the question of an otherwise eligible
Medicaid recipient being refused a medical service, this question has not been submitted
to this Court
The Hospital's reliance on Society of New York Hospital v Mogemen 319
N Y S 2 d 2 5 8 ( N Y Civ Ct 1971), is misplaced The Department of Social Services had
given prior authorization for the services the hospital had provided to the patient
Inasmuch as the department had authorized the care provided and the court was
convinced the department was not foreclosed from receiving federal reimbursement, the
court found the hospital was entitled to payment In the present case, the Hospital did not
obtain prior authorization and does not stand in the same relation to the Division here as
did the hospital m Society of New York Hospital
In re Nemis, 351 A 2d 363 (N J Super Ct 1976), cited by the Hospital, is a
different matter The nursing home in that case prevailed upon the appellate court,
convincing the court it had substantially complied with the requirements to submit
documentation for payment although it had exceeded the division's six-month filing
limitation The majority opinion relates a series of contacts by the home and the division
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as forms were requested and partial billing documentation was submitted in partial
compliance. The division's six-month limitation for submitting payment claims was
facially reasonable and the delays in filing could be shared by both the home and the
division. Nevertheless, the majority found that to affirm the denial of payment placed
procedural form above the purpose of the medical assistance program.
The Hospital wants this Court to decide that affirming the Division's decision is
placing procedural form over purpose. The prior authorization required for all
transplantations is the preliminary step providers are required to take in submitting
medical justification to the Division for review for Medicaid coverage for the planned
transplantation. In South Davis the hospital's belated delivery of records did not satisfy
this Court that DHCF was required to accept what the hospital argued was the equivalent
of the certification requirement. In the instant case, the Hospital argued it began
collecting a large volume of material concerning the patient's transplantation at the time
of discharge on September 19, 1997, and submitted the material to the Division in
October. [Tr. at 100.] By failing to submit the documentation and prior authorization
request, the Division was prevented from performing its statutory oversight duties and
from complying with the requirement that it administer an efficient, economical and
quality medical assistance program through application of its utilization control measures.
The cases helpful to this Court's determinations concern the preconditions
providers must satisfy to comply with conditions of payment. From the Hospital's own
witness's testimony it is evident the Hospital understands the importance of requirements
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precedent to payment for services. The following exchange between the Division's
representative cross-examining the Hospital's witness Mr. Fairbourn clarifies the extent
of the Hospital's understanding.
Q: Now, do you ever work with other insurances with patients who are trying to
seek a service? Do you ever work with other insurance companies?
A: Yes, I do.
Q: Do they require - Are you aware if they require prior authorization for services
to be paid?
A: Some of them do, and some do not.
Q: What about the ones that do? Are you ever involved with contacting them to
see if you comply with their prior authorization requirements?
A: On the ones we have contracted for, yes, we do contact them for that
authorization.
Q: How seriously do you take that responsibility?
A: Very seriously.
[Tr.at 38.]
The Hospital offered no justification for abdicating its responsibility to get prior
authorization for Sean Daugaard's bone marrow transplantation. The denial of Medicaid
reimbursement, based on the Hospital's failure to comply with the pre-authorization
requirement, should be affirmed.
II.

THE REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR AUTHORIZATION
WAS NOT WAIVED.
The Hospital's position that the Division provided "misinformation" and thereby

"prevented" [App. Br. at 14-15] the Hospital from complying with the requirement for
prior authorization, is not supported in the record. The Hospital argues such
misinformation preventing its compliance with the requirement for prior authorization
proves the Division waived the requirement. [App. Br. at 14.]
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The record before this Court does not support the Hospital's late assertion of
waiver. "[Wjaiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. To constitute
waiver, there must be an existing right benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its
existence, and an intention to relinquish it." Soter's Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan
Assoc, 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993). The transcript provides nothing evidencing a
voluntary, intentional relinquishment of the prior authorization requirement. Nor is there
evidenced "such a course of conduct" that Ms. Lucero intended to waive a Division rule,
even assuming she had the authority to do so. Most importantly, since the Hospital did
not raise waiver as a defense at the hearing below, this Court should not consider it for
the first time on appeal. Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm Jn, 947 P.2d 671,
677 (Utah 1997); Brinkerhoffv. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
III.

POST-TRANSPLANTATION AUTHORIZATION RULES
ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
Post-transplantation authorization for circumstances not fitting within the standard

prior authorization rules is defined and governed by agency rules. Under Utah Admin.
Code R414-10A-3(10) (1996), an ^emergency transplantation" is defined as "any
transplantation which for reasons of medical necessity requires that a transplant be
performed less than five days after determination of the need for the procedure." This
rule also defines "transplantation." It is evident the Division intended to identify and
distinguish two potential transplantation scenarios.
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Through the efforts of the Hospital's resource counselor Mr. Fairbourn, Sean
obtained Medicaid eligibility in March 1997, well in advance of the anticipated
transplantation in July 1997. This case cannot be defined as an "emergency
transplantation/' It follows that the program access requirements permitting posttransplant authorization [see Utah Admin. Code R414-10A-5(5) (1996)] for
transplantation services in "unusual, emergency circumstances" is similarly inapplicable.
This was not an "emergency." It was usual for the Hospital to recognize insurance
companies have prior authorization requirements. The Hospital complied with these
requirements, taking them "very seriously." [Tr. at 38.] No reasonable explanation
exists, nor was one ever given, for the Hospital's dichotomy in logic in ignoring the prior
authorization requirements imposed by Medicaid.
The Hospital argues that testimony elicited from one of the Hospital's Transplant
Program Managers, Ms. Bernadette McNally, established that retroactive authorization
should be granted in this case. However, her testimony did not establish the unusual
emergency circumstances justifying post-transplantation authorization for the present
case. She gave no facts explaining the circumstances leading up to the month of
transplantation that would satisfy the agency's post-transplantation rules for "unusual,
emergency" circumstances.
The Hospital knew for over four months prior to the scheduled transplantation that
it had helped the patient qualify for Medicaid and then the Hospital knowing all
transplantations require prior authorization, did not follow through with the requirements
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to obtain prior authorization. This is not the ''unusual emergency" circumstance
contemplated by the rule.
The Division's application in this instance of the standard rules governing prior
authorization of transplantations was correct.
IV.

THE HOSPITAL DID NOT ESTABLISH EACH ELEMENT
OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.
Reviewing the essential elements which the Hospital must establish to invoke

estoppel against the Division, it is apparent that the required elements have not been
established.
The elements necessary to invoke equitable estoppel are: (1) a statement,
admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later
asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the
basis of the first party's statement admission, act, or failure to act; and (3)
injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first party to
repudiate such statement admission, act or failure to act.
Orton v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 864 P.2d 904, 909 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citations
omitted).
The focus of the Hospital's contention is the events of July 9, 1997, when Mr.
Fairbourn testified he looked at the computer system for Sean's eligibility and observed
computer screens showing no eligibility. He explained the Hospital had access to read
the state's Medicaid eligibility system and was surprised to see no eligibility, knowing
that Medicaid eligibility had been established for the prior months. He also testified he
went to see Ms. Lucero, and asked her "how it was that we had worked with this family
to get Medicaid eligibility and here we come to this point in time when there is no
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eligibility/' [Tr. at 21.] He then testified Ms. Lucero told him "[t]hat it was time for
review/' and "we needed a new application to begin the process over again and then reestablish eligibility." [Tr. at 21.] In response to the conversation Mr. Fairbourn testified
he had with Ms. Lucero, he went to Sean's room at the hospital, had Mrs. Daugaard fill in
and sign the Medicaid application, then took the completed form back to Ms. Lucero. [Tr.
at 22.]
His next affirmative act concerning Sean's case occurred on August 1, 1997, when
he conducted his routine review of his accounts in which he matched his accounts with
the information he could access in the state's Medicaid eligibility system. On that date he
observed that Sean had Medicaid coverage for July and August. [Tr. at 23.]
This recitation of events shows, first, the state employee did not say or do anything
which rises to the level of conduct to establish the first element of proof contemplated by
estoppel cases. Mr. Fairbourn testified Ms. Lucero told him it was time for a review; this
is not the type of information which should cause the Hospital to neglect its obligation to
comply with the prior authorization requirements imposed upon participating providers in
the Medicaid program. As the court in Mercy Hospital observed in deciding against the
hospital's contention that DWP should be estopped to deny reimbursement for a patient's
medical care, "hospitals participating in the Medical Assistance Program are charged with
knowledge of the applicable DPW regulations." Mercy Hospital, 492 A.2d at 106 n.2.
The second necessary element, reasonable reliance, is also not established. Mr.
Fairbourn testified that, after handing the newly signed application for review to Ms.
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Lucero, he did nothing more but schedule a routine review notation for August 1, 1997, in
spite of his statements that the computer screen information on July 9 generated "a great
amount of excitement" [Tr. at 20], and because of the "large dollars . . . we [had] a great
interest in making sure that there [was] eligibility." [Tr. at 29.]
Since the question before this Court concerns the Hospital's failure to obtain the
required prior authorization, the focus should be on the Hospital's conduct subsequent to
the Medicaid eligibility obtained for Sean in March 1997. The Hospital worked with
Sean's family to obtain Medicaid coverage in anticipation of the soon-to-be-scheduled
bone marrow transplantation. Prior authorization is required for all transplantation
services. Utah Admin. Code R414-10A-7(1) (1996). The patient was admitted July 8 in
anticipation of the bone marrow transplant. It is the provider who must obtain prior
authorization from the Division before providing services which require prior
authorization. Utah Admin. Code R414-10-2(14) (1996). If that requires that the provider
make certain the preliminary steps are completed, then the routine August 1 follow-up
date is not indicative of reasonable reliance based upon the preceding events. Facts the
Hospital knew or had reason to know were: (1) Sean had Medicaid coverage beginning
in March, (2) the medical service to be provided was a bone marrow transplantation, (3)
all transplantation services to be covered by Medicaid require prior authorization, (4)
Sean's hospital admission date was July 8, (5) the scheduled date the Hospital had set for
the transplantation procedure was July 17.
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Even given Mr. Fairbounf s description of the exchanges he had with Ms. Lucero
on July 9, the effect of those exchanges in no way justified the Hospital's failure to obtain
the required prior authorization prior to providing services. To invoke estoppel against
the Division the Hospital had to establish that its conduct was justifiable because it
reasonably relied upon the statements of Ms. Lucero. However, the Hospital's conduct
cannot be deemed reasonable since it had knowledge of all the facts and events necessary
for it to comply with the Medicaid program's requirements for reimbursement.
Preconditions to health insurance coverage are the norm. Providers and insureds
are required to comply with the requirements of each plan to which they look for
reimbursement or coverage. In Roberts v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 653 So.2d 956
(Ala. 1995), the Supreme Court of Alabama held that Roberts could not recover
reimbursement from Blue Cross for a surgical procedure because she failed to obtain
preadmission certification required under her contract of benefits.
Roberts is interesting because of the facts surrounding the particular surgery for
which Blue Cross denied payment. Under the insurance policy, Roberts had had two
previous in-patient surgeries and the one occasioning the lawsuit were all recommended
and performed by the same physician. The physician's office manager, Ms. Joiner, had
called the insurance company for the two previous surgeries and arranged for the
precertification. She also telephoned Blue Cross for precertification for the disputed
surgery.
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This time, however, when she called Blue Cross their computers were down. This
meant Blue Cross could not know if the policy was in force for the particular patient nor
could it issue the pre-admission certification number which would indicate completion of
the certification process. Notwithstanding, allegedly the Blue Cross representative told
Ms. Joiner to go ahead and admit the patient and she would call back about the preadmission certification number when the computer came back up.
Ms. Joiner flagged the file indicating a return call was expected or that follow-up
was required for the certification. However, no one from Blue Cross called back and Ms.
Joiner did not pursue the precertification before Roberts was admitted for her surgery.
No one disputed that pre-admission certification was not done. Roberts contended
she relied on the representations of Ms. Joiner who told her she had "already taken care
of it" and because Ms. Joiner "had always done it." Id. at 957. However, Roberts' own
testimony established she knew pre-admission certification was required for payment and
she knew she had not obtained a pre-admission certification number for the proposed
surgery. The Roberts court concluded that the verdict upholding Blue Cross' denial of
payment was proper because under the contract between the company and the insured,
the insured was required to obtain pre-admission certification.
Similarly, as a participating provider the Hospital was required to obtain prior
authorization from the Division prior to Sean's bone marrow transplantation if it wanted
reimbursement from Medicaid. By rule adopted by the Division, the participating
provider has the affirmative duty to obtain prior authorization.
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V.

EVEN IF THE ELEMENTS OF ESTOPPEL WERE
ESTABLISHED, THE HOSPITAL DID NOT PROVE THE
FACTS NECESSARY TO MEET THE UNUSUAL
CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION.
The doctrine of estoppel generally is not assertable against the government for

sound, valid reasons. The interests of the public must be safeguarded against "the
vagaries of political tides, frequent changes of public officials, the possibility of
collusion, or of circumventing procedures set up by law, then suing for the value of goods
furnished or services rendered." Utah State University v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718
(Utah 1982). The Court in Sutro & Co. considered, at great length, the policy behind the
doctrine and the occasions where the reviewing courts found that the general rule should
not control. Under "unusual circumstances," the exception to the general rule was
invoked to avoid an obvious injustice.
A decade later, the Supreme Court of Utah, deciding Anderson v. Public Service
Comm 'n, 839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992), again stated that absent the exception of unusual
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circumstances, the general rule that estoppel may not be asserted against the government
should apply. The Anderson Court stated "[tjhis exception applies, however, only if 'the
facts may be found with such certainty, and the injustice suffered is of sufficient gravity,
to invoke the exception.'" Anderson, 839 P.2d at 827 (quoting Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d at
720.)
Describing the limited application of estoppel against the government in Utah
decisions, the Court in Anderson explained that the "few cases in which Utah courts have
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permitted estoppel against the government have involved very specific written
representations by authorized government entities." Id. at 827.
Among the cases specifically referenced by the Anderson Court is Eldredge v.
Utah State Retirement Bd., 795 P.2d 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), a case upon which the
Hospital particularly relies. The Anderson Court pointed out that representatives of the
Retirement Board made affirmative assurances, orally and in writing, to Eldredge that he
would receive credit towards his retirement benefit for over six years of prior county
service. The Court noted the representations were explicit were in writing and were
repeated.
The Retirement Office representatives made specific written assurances to
Eldredge of his monthly benefit amount and upon these representations Eldredge
reasonably relied, making irrevocable life changes when he retired. The information
needed to determine retirement benefits was wholly within the control of the Retirement
Office and the information was complete and accurately reflected Eldredge's years of
service. The Anderson Court noted the irrevocable nature of Eldredge's decision also
weighed heavily in favor of applying the exception and invoking estoppel against the
Retirement Office in his case.
The matter before this Court, however, is not one which justifies application of the
exception to the doctrine of estoppel against the government. The Division made no
explicit, repeated, written representations to the Hospital about prior authorization.
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In Baptist Memorial Hospital 13 F. Supp.2d 696, the hospital was denied payment
from the patient's Employee Retirement Income Security Act [ERISA]-governed
insurance plan for medical services provided totaling $356,984.57. On appeal, the
hospital's equitable estoppel claim also was denied. The court found that the case relied
upon by BMH in support of its assertion that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be
applied to the ERISA benefits plan was distinguishable because in that case
"correspondence that served as the foundation for plaintiffs estoppel argument amounted
to a written modification of the underlying contract for benefits. . . ." Id. at 704. This
was critical because, as the BMH court pointed out, "the applicability of estoppel
principles in ERISA cases is controversial because ERISA forbids the conferral of
benefits other than in accordance with the written ERISA plan." Id (citation omitted).
The BMH court found that without evidence of the benefit fund's representations it
intended to modify the specific plan term at issue, there was no reason to apply the
reasoning of an ERISA case in which estoppel was invoked against the ERISA plan.
This reasoning applies to the case before this Court. Equitable estoppel as a
general rule is not assertable against the government. In the few instances in Utah where
the courts have permitted estoppel against the government, the decisions were based upon
finding "very specific written representations." Anderson, 839 P.2d at 827. Such
representations are nonexistent in the present case.
In its brief, the Hospital relies upon Society of New York Hospital v. Mogensen,
319 N.Y.S.2d 258 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971), mdMagnant v. Ambulatory Renal Services, 575
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N.E.2d 1029 (Ind. App. 1991), to justify estoppel against the Division. However, the
reliance is misplaced because in both cases the Department of Social Services and the
Department of Public Welfare, respectively, had given prior authorization for the services
which providers gave. The Hospital in the case before this Court wants to skip the
threshold question of prior authorization, which was never contested in the New York
and Indiana cases.
In Orton v. Utah State Tax Comm >2, 864 P.2d 904, the court reiterated the
elements of estoppel and the particular additional requirement of "manifest injustice"
where a governmental entity is involved; however, the court held "that 'sound public
policy precludes the assertion of estoppel against the Commission for an incorrect
assessment made by its auditor based upon inadequate facts.'" Orton, 864 P.2d at 909
(quoting O 'Rourke v. Utah State Tax Commission, 830 P.2d 230 (Utah 1992) (citations
omitted). Inadequate information provided by the Ortons resulted in an inaccurate
assessment by the auditor, which in turn caused the withdrawal of a tax assessment
against the Ortons. It was not until later, and upon more complete information, that the
tax liability of the Ortons was properly assessed and which the Ortons challenged. Nor
did the court find manifest injustice if the Ortons had to pay the taxes assessed since the
taxes were properly assessed and the Ortons were lawfully required to pay them.
While Orton is not an exact comparison to the circumstances of the Hospital, the
fact that the Medicaid eligibility status was due for review suggests more information was
necessary. Also, the Hospital was in a position to know from March up to the anticipated
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transplantation date in July that prior authorization was a precondition to covered services
for transplantations. The Hospital was required to take the necessary steps to comply
with the prior authorization precondition. While Mr. Fairbounf s testimony established
that the Hospital was concerned with the coverage for the expensive procedure, it is not
sufficient in itself to say that manifest injustice would result if estoppel is not asserted
against the Division. As shown in the Baptist Memorial Hospital decision, $356,984.57
in medical service costs was not sufficient to cause the court to apply estoppel against the
benefit fund when the hospital failed to comply with the terms of the plan.
CONCLUSION
The Division is charged with the responsibility of establishing and administering
the Medicaid program in Utah. In performing its duties, it must operate the program in an
effective, efficient, economical manner. The legislature has explicitly granted the
Division discretion in establishing and implementing program criteria. Under that grant
of discretion, the Division has interpreted and applied its agency rules to the
circumstances involving the Hospital, which are the subject of the appeal before this
Court. It did so consistent with the Medical Assistance Act and consistent with the rules
promulgated by the agency.
The Hospital, as a Medicaid provider, is charged with knowledge of the program
requirements and is bound to comply with the rules and regulations governing
participation. Under the program rules for transplantations, providers must obtain prior
authorization for transplantations. Only under "unusual, emergency circumstances" do
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the program rules provide for post-transplantation authorization.
The Hospital did not provide any set of circumstances satisfying the prior
authorization requirements nor did it provide any reasonable explanation for its failure to
request prior authorization. Neither did the Hospital provide any basis for application of
the "emergency transplantation" rules limited to unusual, emergency circumstances.
The Division never gave any misinformation to the Hospital which would
reasonably cause the Hospital to believe prior authorization requirements would not be
followed. Since the Medicaid program must be operated in an efficient, economical
manner and use of accepted utilization control measures which are reasonable is a
rational means to achieve the program's objectives, the Division's decision in this matter
should be affirmed.
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Addenda

Addendum A

Ch. 7

MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

4 2 § 1396

Laboratories excluded from participation under this subchapter, see 42 USCA
§ 263a.
Maximum amount available to Saint Elizabeths Hospital from Federal sources,
see 24 USCA § 170a.
Medical care for military spouses and children, see 10 USCA § 1079.
Modification of mortgage insurance of hospital receiving revenue from program
under this subchapter, see 12 USCA § 1715z-7.
National Health Services Corps Programs, see 42 USCA § 254d et seq.
Notice by Secretary describing limited benefits for long-term care services, see
42 USCA § 1395b-2.
Office of Rural Health Policy; determination of effects of policies under this
subchapter, see 42 USCA § 912.
Payment for services m general—
Health fcare costs incurred by military dependents, see 10 USCA § 1095.
Health maintenance organizations, see 42 USCA §§ 1395mm, 1395w.
Physicians' services, see 42 USCA §§ 1395w-l, 1395w-4.
Reasonable charges, factors considered, see 42 USCA § 1395u.
State imposed higher requirements as condition to purchase of services; like
requirements as condition of payment, see 42 USCA § 1395z.
Veterans' Administration, department of medicine and surgery, acceptance
of payments, see 38 USCA § 4108.
Payment for services to hospitals—
Average reasonable cost per patient-day, see 42 USCA § 1395tt.
Determination of reasonable costs, development of model systems, see 42
USCA §§ 1320b-3, 1320b-4
State hospital reimbursement control system, see 42 USCA § 1395ww
Payments under National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, see 42 USCA
§ 300aa-15
Peer review; general provisions, see 42 USCA § 1301 et seq.
Period within which State must file claim for expenditures under program, see
42 USCA § 1320b-2.
Pooling of funds for transportation services with State or area agencies on aging,
see 42 USCA § 3026.
Program under this subchapter not health-plan contract for purposes of recovery
of costs of certain veterans' care services, see 38 USCA § 629.
State plan for child and spousal support; determination of paternity of child
born out of wedlock, support from parents for child in foster care, see 42
USCA § 654.
State plan requirements—
Federal-State pilot program to provide medical and social services for
certain handicapped individuals, see 42 USCA § 1382i.
Income and eligibility verification system, see 42 USCA § 1320b-7
Waiver, disallowance of items, see 42 USCA §§ 1315, 1316.
State planning councils for persons with developmental disabilities; representative of State agency administering program included, see 42 USCA § 6024
Student loans with respect to services in certain health care facilities in underserved areas, requirements with respect to facilities, see 42 USCA § 297n.
Utilization and quality control peer review organization, see 42 USCA § 1320c et
seq.

§ 1396.

Appropriations

For the purpose of enabling each State, as far as practicable
under the conditions in such State, to furnish (1) medical assistance
on behalf of families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or
disabled individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient
to meet the costs of necessary medical services, and (2) rehabilita385
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tion and other services to help such families and individuals attain
or retain capability for independence or self-care, there is hereby
authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year a sum sufficient
to carry out the purposes of this subchapter. The sums made
available under this section shall be used for making payments to
States which have submitted, and had approved by the Secretary,
State plans for medical assistance.
(Aug. 14, 1935, c. 531, Title XIX, § 1901, as added July 30, 1965, Pub.L.
89-97, TMe I, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 343, and amended Dec. 31, 1973, Pub.L.
93-233, § 13(a)(1), 87 Stat. 960; July 18, 1984, Pub.L. 98-369, Div. B, Title
VI, § 2663(j)(3)(C), 98 Stat. 1171.)
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Revision Notes and
1965 Act. Senate
Conference Report
U.S.Code Cong, and

Legislative Reports
Report No. 404 and
No. 682, see 1965
Adm.News, p. 1943.

1973 Act. House Report No. 93-627,
see 1973 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News,
p. 3177.
t>
• KT no ^ i
lfl(M . ,
u
1984 Act. House Report No. 98-432
Part II and House Conference Report
No. 98-861, see 1984 U.S.Code Cong, and
&
. , KT
,Qm. ews, p.
.
.
,
l1984
o ^ ^ fAmendment.
A
•
r>
u T oo
vn
Pub.L.
98-369
struck out "of Health and Human Services" following "Secretary". See Change
of Name note set out under this section.
1973 Amendment. Pub.L. 93-233 substituted in item (1) "disabled individuals"
for "permanently and totally disabled individuals".

Effective Dates
1984 Act. Amendment by Pub.L.
98-369 effective July 18, 1984, but not to
be
construed as changing or affecting
any right, liability, status or interpretation which existed (under the provisions
of law involved) before that date, see
section 2664(b) of Pub.L. 98-369, set out
as a note
under section 401 of this title.
^g%mmmkA m
.
,
.
_ ,_
™\\
*
'
.
Amendment
by
Pub.L.
93 2 33
" t
effective with respect to payments under section 1396b of this title
£Qr c a j e n c j a r quarters commencing after
13(d) of Pub.L. 93-233,
sDec.
e t o u 31,
t a s 1973,
a n o t see
e
under section 1396a of
^. t - t j
Change of Name
"Secretary of Health and Human Services" was substituted for "Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare" in text
pursuant to section 509(b) of Pub.L.
96-88 which is classified to section
3508(b) of Title 20, Education.

LIBRARY REFERENCES
Administrative Law
Federal financial participation, see 45 C.F.R. § 304.10 et seq.
Medicare and Medicaid, see West's Federal Practice Manual § 5811 et seq.
State fiscal administration, see 42 C.F.R. § 433.1 et seq.
American Digest System
Appropriations and disbursement of federal funds, see United States <s=»82 et
seq.
Medical assistance programs, see Social Security and Public Welfare <s=3241 et
seq.
Encyclopedias
Appropriations and disbursement of federal funds, see C.J.S. United States § 122
et seq.
Medical assistance programs, see C.J.S. Social Security and Public Welfare § 126
et seq.
Law Reviews
Barriers to hospital diversification: The regulatory environment. Reed Hamilton, 24 Duquesne L.Rev. 425 (1985).
Behind closed doors: The confidentiality of psychotherapeutic records in
medicaid fraud investigations. 6 Pace L.Rev. 441 (1986).
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3. Eligibility
Although persons eligible for Aid to
Families with Dependent Children are
automatically eligible for medicaid, persons who do not qualify for welfare assistance may nevertheless still qualify
for medicaid. Perez v. Lavine, D.C.N.Y.
1976, 412 F.Supp. 1340, supplemented
422 F.Supp. 1259.
If alien was permanently residing in
United States under color of law within
meaning of federal regulation, she was
eligible to receive Medicaid benefits,
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even though she was not eligible pursuant to state regulation. Cruz v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 1985, 478
N.E.2d 1262, 395 Mass. 107.
In order for person to qualify for
medicaid, that person must be eligible,
and to be eligible a person must qualify
under a state plan which agrees with all
the statutes and regulations promulgated
under this chapter. Flathead Health
Center v. Flathead County, 1979, 598
P*2d 1111, 183 Mont. 211.

§ 1 3 9 6 a . State plans for medical assistance
(a) Contents
A State plan for medical assistance must—
(1) provide that it shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the State, and, if administered by them, be mandatory
upon them;
(2) provide for financial participation by the State equal to
not less than 40 per centum of the non-Federal share of the
expenditures under the plan with respect to which payments
under section 1396b of this title are authorized by this subchapter; and, effective July 1, 1969, provide for financial participation by the State equal to all of such non-Federal share or
provide for distribution of funds from Federal or State sources,
for carrying out the State plan, on an equalization or other
basis which will assure that the lack of adequate funds from
local sources will not result in lowering the amount, duration,
scope, or quality of care and services available under the plan;
(3) provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing
before the State agency to any individual whose claim for
medical assistance under the plan is denied or is not acted upon
with reasonable promptness;
(4) provide (A) such methods of administration (including
methods relating to the establishment and maintenance of
personnel standards on a merit basis, except that the Secretary
shall exercise no authority with respect to the selection, tenure
of office, and compensation of any individual employed in
accordance with such methods, and including provision for
utilization of professional medical personnel in the administration and, where administered locally, supervision of administration of the plan) as are found by the Secretary to be necessary for the proper and efficient operation of the plan, (B) for
the training and effective use of paid subprofessional staff, with
particular emphasis on the full-time or part-time employment
388
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of recipients and other persons of low income, as community
service aides, in the administration of the plan and for the use
of nonpaid or partially paid volunteers in a social service
volunteer program in providing services to applicants and recipients and in assisting any advisory committees established
by the State agency, and (C) that each State or local officer or
employee who is responsible for the expenditure of substantial
amounts of funds under the State plan, each individual who
formerly was such an officer or employee, and each partner of
such an officer or employee shall be prohibited from committing any act, in relation to any activity under the plan, the
commission of which, in connection with any activity concerning the United States Government, by an officer or employee of
the United States Government, an individual who was such an
officer or employee, or a partner of such an officer or employee is prohibited by section 207 or 208 of Title 18;
(5) either provide for the establishment or designation of a
single State agency to administer or to supervise the administration of the plan; or provide for the establishment or designation of a single State agency to administer or to supervise the
administration of the plan, except that the determination of
eligibility for medical assistance under the plan shall be made
by the State or local agency administering the State plan approved under subchapter I or XVI of this chapter (insofar as it
relates to the aged) if the State is eligible to participate in the
State plan program established under subchapter XVI of this
chapter, or by the agency or agencies administering the supplemental security income program established under subchapter
XVI or the State plan approved under part A of subchapter IV
of this chapter if the State is not eligible to participate in the
State plan program established under subchapter XVI of this
chapter;
(6) provide that the State agency will make such reports, in
such form and containing such information, as the Secretary
may from time to time require, and comply with such provisions as the Secretary may from time to time find necessary to
assure the correctness and verification of such reports;
(7) provide safeguards which restrict the use or disclosure of
information concerning applicants and recipients to purposes
directly connected with the administration of the plan;
(8) provide that all individuals wishing to make application
for medical assistance under the plan shall have opportunity to
do so, and that such assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals;
(9) provide—
389
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than April 1 after the end of each fiscal year, beginning
with fiscal year 1990) the following information relating to
early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment
services provided under the plan during each fiscal yean
(i) the number of children provided child health
screening services,
(ii) the number of children referred for corrective
treatment (the need for which is disclosed by such
child health screening services),
(III) the number of children receiving dental services, and
(iv) the State's results in attaining the participation
goals set for the State under section 1396d(r) of this
title;
(44) in each case for which payment for inpatient hospital
services, services in an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded, or inpatient mental hospital services is made under
the State plan—
(A) a physician (or, in the case of skilled nursing facility
services or intermediate care facility services, a physician,
or a nurse practitioner or clinical nurse specialist who is
not an employee of the facility but is working in collaboration with a physician) certifies at the time of admission, or,
if later, the time the individual applies for medical assistance under the State plan (and a physician, a physician
assistant under the supervision of a physician, or, in the
case of skilled nursing facility services or intermediate care
facility services, a physician, or a nurse practitioner or
clinical nurse specialist who is not an employee of the
facility but is working in collaboration with a physician,
recertifies, where such services are furnished over a period
of time, in such cases, at least as often as required under
section 1396b(g)(6) of this title (or, in the case of services
that are services provided in an intermediate care facility
for the mentally retarded, every year), and accompanied by
such supporting material, appropriate to the case involved,
as may be provided in regulations of the Secretary), that
such services are or were required to be given on an
inpatient basis because the individual needs or needed such
services, and
(B) such services were furnished under a plan established and periodically reviewed and evaluated by a physician, or, in the case of skilled nursing facility services or
intermediate care facility services, a physician, or a nurse
412
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456.481 Admission certification and plan of
care.
456.482 Medical, psychiatric, and social
evaluations.
Subpart H-Utilization Review Plans: FFP,
Wdfvers, and Variances for Hospitals,
Mental Hospitals, and Skilled Nursing
Facilities

456.500 Purpose.
456.501 UR plans as a condition for FFP.
UR PLAN: WAIVER OF REQUIREMENTS

456.505 Applicability of waiver.
456.506 Waiver options for Medicaid agency.
456.507 Review and granting of waiver requests.
456.508 Withdrawal of waiver.
UR PLAN: REMOTE FACILITY VARIANCES FROM
TIME REQUIREMENTS

456.520 Definitions.
456.521 Conditions for granting variance requests.
456.522 Content of request for variance.
456.523 Revised UR plan.
456.524 Notification of Administrator's action and duration of variance.
456.525 Request for renewal of variance.
Subpart I—Inspections of Care in Skilled
Nursing and Intermediate Care Facilities and Institutions for Mental Diseases

456.600 Purpose.
456.601 Definitions.
456.602 Inspection team.
456.603 Financial interests and employment
of team members.
456.604 Physician team member inspecting
care of recipients.
456.605 Number and location of teams.
456.606 Frequency of inspections.
456.607 Notification before inspection.
456.608 Personal contact with and observation of recipients and review of records.
456.609 Determinations by team.
456.610 Basis for determinations.
456.611 Reports on inspections.
456.612 Copies of reports.
456.613 Action on reports.
456.614 Inspections by utilization review
committee.
Subpart J—Penalty for Failure To Make a
Satisfactory Showing of An Effective Institutional Utilization Control Program

456.650 Basis, purpose, and scope.
456.651 Definitions.
456.652 Requirements for an effective utilization control program.
456.653 Acceptable reasons for not meeting
requirements far annual on-site review.
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456.654 Requirements
for content of
showings and procedures for submittal.
456.655 Validation of showings.
456.656 Reductions in FFP.
456.657 Computation of reductions in FFP.
Subpart K-Oaig Use Review (OUR) Program and Electronic Claims Management System for Outpatient Drug
Claims

456.700 Scope.
456.702 Definitions.
456.703 Drug use review program.
456.705 Prospective drug review.
456.709 Retrospective drug use review.
456.711 Educational program.
456.712 Annual report.
456.714 DUR/surveillance and utilization review relationship.
456.716 DUR Board.
456.719 Funding for DUR program.
456.722 Electronic claims management system.
456.725 Funding of ECM system.
AUTHORITY: Sec. 1102 of the Social Security

Act (42 U.S.C. 1302), unless otherwise noted.
SOURCE: 43 FR 45266, Sept. 29, 1978, unless
otherwise noted.
Subpart A—General Provisions
§ 456.1 Basis and purpose of part.
(a) This part prescribes requirements
concerning control of the utilization of
Medicaid services including—
(1) A statewide program of control of
the utilization of all Medicaid services;
and
(2) Specific requirements for the control of the utilization of Medicaid services in institutions.
(3) Specific requirements for an outpatient drug use review program.
(b) The requirements in this part are
bassd on the following sections of the
Act, Table 1 shows the relationship between these sections of the Act and the
requirements in this part.
(1) Methods and procedures to safeguard against unnecessary utilization of
care and services. Section 1902(a)(30) requires that the State plan provide
methods and procedures to safeguard
against unnecessary utilization of care
and services.
(2) Penalty for failure to have an effective program to control utilization of institutional services. Section 1903(g)(1) provides for a reduction in the amount of
Federal Medicaid funds paid to a State
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for long-stay inpatient services if the
State does not make a showing satisfactory to the Secretary that it has an
effective program of control over utilization of those services. This penalty
provision applies to inpatient services
in hospitals, mental hospitals, skilled
nursing facilities (SNF's), and intermediate care facilities (ICF's). Specific
requirements are:
(i) Under section 1903(g)(1)(A), a physician must certify at admission, and a
physician (or physician assistant or
nurse practitioner under the supervision of a physician) must periodically
recertify, the individual's need for inpatient care.
(ii) Under section 1903(g)(1)(B), services must be furnished under a plan established and periodically evaluated by
a physician.
(iii) Under section 1903(g)(1)(C), the
State must have in effect a continuous
program of review of utilization of care
and services under section 1902(a)(30)
whereby each admission is reviewed or
screened in accordance with criteria
established by medical and other professional personnel.
(iv) Under section 1903(g)(1)(D), the
State must have an effective program
under sections 1902(a) (26) and (31) of review of care in skilled nursing and intermediate care facilities and mental
hospitals. This must include evaluation
at least annually of the professional
management of each case.
(3) Medical review in skilled nursing facilities and mental hospitals. Section
1902(a)(26)(A) requires that the plan
provide for a program of medical review that includes a medical evaluation of each individual's need for care
in a SNF or mental hospital, a plan of
care, and, where applicable, a plan of
rehabilitation.
(4) Independent professional review in
intermediate
care facilities.
Section
1902(a)(31)(A) requires that the plan
provide for a program of independent
professional review that includes a
medical evaluation of each individual's
need for intermediate care and a written plan of service.
(5) Inspection of care and services in institutions. Sections 1902(a)(26) (B) and
(C) and 1902(a)(31) (B) and (C) require
that the plan provide for periodic inspections and reports, by a team of pro-

fessional persons, of the care being provided to each recipient in SNF's, institutions for mental diseases (IMD's),
and ICF's participating in Medicaid.
(6) Denial of FFP for failure to have
specified utilization review procedures.
Section 1903(i)(4) provides that FFP is
not available in a State's expenditures
for hospital, mental hospital, or SNF
services unless the institution has in
effect a utilization review plan that
meets Medicare requirements. However, the Secretary may waive this requirement if the Medicaid agency demonstrates to his satisfaction that it has
utilization review procedures superior
in effectiveness to the Medicare procedures.
(7) State health agency guidance on
quality and appropriateness of care and
services. Section 1902(a)(33)(A) requires
that the plan provide that the State
health or other appropriate medical
agency establish a plan for review, by
professional health personnel, of the
appropriateness and quality of Medicaid services to provide guidance to the
Medicaid agency and the State licensing agency in administering the Medicaid program.
(8) Drug use review program. Section
1927(g) of the Act provides that, for
payment to be made under section 1903
of the Act for covered outpatient
drugs, the State must have in operation, by not later than January 1,
1993, a drug use review (DUR) program.
It also requires that each State provide, either directly or through a contract with a private organization , for
the establishment of a DUR Board.
TABLE 1
[This table relates the regulations in this part to the sections
of the Act on which they are based.]
Subpart A—General
Subpart B—Utilization Control: All
Medicaid Services.
Subpart C—Utilization Control: Hospitals
Certification of need for care
Ran of care
Utilization review plan (including
admission review).
Subpart D—Utilization Control: Mental
Hospitals
Certification of need for care
Medical evaluation and admission
review.
Ran of care
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1902(a)(30)
1902(a)(33)(A)
1902(a)(30)

1903(g)(1)(A)
1903(g)(1)(B)
1902(a)(30)
1903(g)(1)(C)
1903(i)(4)

1903(g)(1)(A)
1902(a)(26)(A)
1903(g)(1)(C)
1902(a)(26)(A)
1903(g)(1)(B)

Health Care Financing Administration, HHS
TABLE 1—Continued
(This table relates the regulations m this part to the sections
of the Act on which they are based.]
Admission and plan of care requirements
for
individuals
under 21.
Utilization review plan

1902(a)(26)(A)
1903(g)(1) (B),(C)
1902(a) (30)
1903(g)(1)(C)
! 1903(i)(4)

Subpart E—Utilization Control: Skilled
Nursing Facilities
Certification of need for care
| 1903(g)(1)(A)
Medical evaluation and admission 1902(a)(26)(A)
review.
1903(g)(1)(C)
Plan of care
! 1902(a)(26)(A)
1 1903(g)(1)(B)
Utilization review plan
i 1902(a) (30)
1903(g)(1)(C)
1903(i)(4)
Discharge plan
1902(a)(30)
Subpart F—Utilization Control: Intermediate Care Facilities
Certification of need for care
1903(g)(1)(A)
Medical evaluation and admission 1902(a)(31)(A)
review.
1903(g)(1)(C)
1902(a)(31)(A)
1903(g)(1)(B)
Utilization review plan
1902(a)(30)
1903(g)(1)(C)
1903(i)(4)
Subpart
G—Inpatient
Psychiatric 1905 (a)(16) and (h)
Services for IndrviduaJs Under Age
21: Admission and Plan of Care Requirements.
Subpart H—Utilization Review Plans: 1902(a)(30)
FFP, Waivers, and Variances for 1903(i)(4)
Hospitals, Mental Hospitals and
Skilled Nursing Facilities.
Subpart I—Inspections of Care in 1902(a)(26) (B), (C).
Skilled Nursing and Intermediate
(31)(B).(C)
Care Facilities and Institutions for 1903(g)(1)(D)
Mental Diseases.
Subpart J—Penalty for Failure To 1903(g)
Make a Satisfactory Showing of An
Effective
Institutional
Utilization
Control Program.
Subpart K—Drug Use Review (DUR) 1927(g) and (h)
Program and Electronic Claims
Management System for Outpatient
Drug Claims.

§456.5

for patients who are dually entitled to
benefits under Medicare and Medicaid,
(c) In accordance with §431.15 of this
subchapter, FFP will be available for
expenses incurred in meeting the requirements of this part.
[46 FR 48566, Oct. 1,1981, as amended at 50 FR
15327, Apr. 17, 1985; 51 FR 43198, Dec. 1, 1986]
§45&3 Statewide surveillance and utilization control program.
The Medicaid agency must implement a statewide surveillance and utilization control program that—
(a) Safeguards against unnecessary
or inappropriate use of Medicaid services and against excess payments;
(b) Assesses the quality of those services;
(c) Provides for the control of the
utilization of all services provided
under the plan in accordance with subpart B of this part; and
(d) Provides for the control of the
utilization of inpatient services in accordance with subparts C through I of
this part.

§456.4 Responsibility for monitoring
the utilization control program.
(a) The agency must—
(1) Monitor the statewide utilization
control program;
(2) Take all necessary corrective action to ensure the effectiveness of the
program;
(3) Establish methods and procedures
to implement this section;
[43 FR 45266, Sept. 29, 1978, as amended at 46
(4) Keep copies of these methods and
FR 48561, Oct. 1, 1981; 57 FR 49408, Nov. 2,
procedures on file; and
1992]
(5) Give copies of these methods and
§ 456.2 State plan requirements.
procedures to all staff involved in car(a) A State plan must provide that rying out the utilization control prothe requirements of this part are met. gram.
(b) These requirements may be met
§ 456.5 Evaluation criteria.
by the agency by:
(1) Assuming direct responsibility for
The agency must establish and use
assuring that the requirements of this written criteria for evaluating the appart are met; or
propriateness and quality of Medicaid
(2) Deeming of medical and utiliza- services. This section does not apply to
tion review requirements if the agency services in hospitals, mental hospitals,
contracts with a PRO to perform that and SNFs. For these facilities, see the
review, which in the case of inpatient following sections: §§456.122 and 456.132
acute care review will also serve as the of subpart C; §456.232 of subpart D; and
initial determination for PRO medical §456.332 of subpart E.
necessity and appropriateness review
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PARTI
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
26-18-1. Short title.
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Medical Assistance
Act."
History: C. 1953, 26-18-1, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 17.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1981, ch 126, § 1 repealed former §§ 26-18-1
to 26-18-4 (L 1963, ch 38, §§ 1 to 4, 1969, ch
197, §§ 64, 65, 1971, ch 53, § 1), relating to

26-18-2.

use of confidential information in research
Present §§ 26-18-1 to 26-18-10 were enacted by
§ 17 of the act For present provisions relating
to confidential information, see Chapter 25 of
this title

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Applicant" means any person who requests assistance under the
medical programs of the state.
(2) "Division" means the Division of Health Care Financing within the
department, established under Section 26-18-2.1.
(3) "Client" means a person who the department has determined to be
eligible for assistance under the Medicaid program or the Utah Medical
Assistance Program established under Section 26-18-10.
(4) "Medicaid program" means the state program for medical assistance
for persons who are eligible under the state plan adopted pursuant to Title
XK of the federal Social Security Act.
(5) "Medical or hospital assistance" means services furnished or payments made to or on behalf of recipients of medical or hospital assistance
under state medical programs.
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(6) "Recipient" means a person who has received medical or hospital
assistance under the Medicaid program or the Utah Medical Assistance
Program established under Section 26-18-10.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 1.
Federal Law. — Title XIX of the federal

Social Security Act. cited in Subsection (4), is
compiled as 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.

26-18-2.1. Division — Creation.
There is created, within the department, the Division of Health Care
Financing which shall be responsible for implementing, organizing, and
maintaining the Medicaid program and the Utah Medical Assistance Program
established in Section 26-18-10, in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter and applicable federal law.
History: C. 1963, 26-18-2.1, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 21, § 2.
Sunset Act. — See Section 63-55-226 for the

repeal date of the Division of Health Care
Financing.

26-18-2.2. Director — Appointment — Responsibilities.
The director of the division shall be appointed by the executive director of the
department. The director of the division may employ other employees as
necessary to implement the provisions of this chapter, and shall:
(1) administer the responsibilities of the division as set forth in this
chapter;
(2) prepare and administer the division's budget; and
(3) establish and maintain a state plan for the Medicaid program in
compliance with federal law and regulations.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.2, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 21, § 3.

26-18-2.3. Division responsibilities — Emphasis — Periodic assessment.
(1) In accordance with the requirements of Title XEK of the Social Security
Act and applicable federal regulations, the division is responsible for the
effective and impartial administration of this chapter in an efficient, economical manner. The division shall establish, on a statewide basis, a program to
safeguard against unnecessary or inappropriate use of Medicaid services,
excessive payments, and unnecessary or inappropriate hospital admissions or
lengths of stay. The division shall deny any provider claim for services that fail
to meet criteria established by the division concerning medical necessity or
appropriateness. The division shall place its emphasis on high quality care to
recipients in the most economical and cost-effective manner possible, with
regard to both publicly and privately provided services.
(2) The division shall implement and utilize cost-containment methods,
where possible, which may include, but are not limited to:
(a) prepayment and postpayment review systems to determine if utilization is reasonable and necessary;
(b) preadmission certification of nonemergency admissions;
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(c) mandatory outpatient, rather than inpatient, surgery in appropriate
cases;
(d) second surgical opinions;
(e) procedures for encouraging the use of outpatient services;
(f) coordination of benefits; and
(gj review and exclusion of providers who are not cost effective or who
have abused the Medicaid program, in accordance with the procedures and
provisions of federal law and regulation.
(3) The director of the division shall periodically assess the cost effectiveness and health implications of the existing Medicaid program, and consider
alternative approaches to the provision of covered health and medical services
through the Medicaid program, in order to reduce unnecessary or unreasonable utilization.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.3, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 21, § 4.
Federal Law. — Title XIX of the federal

Social Security Act, cited in Subsection (1), is
compiled as 42 U S.C § 1396 et seq

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Discretion of division.
Resource preservation
Discretion of division.
The legislature has, by virtue of Subsection
(1), explicitly granted the Division of Health
Care Financmg (DHCF) discretion to establish
criteria concerning medical reimbursement
When a hospital failed to submit a physician
certification before admission of a Medicaideligible patient and never obtained physician
recertification at any time during the patient's
three-month stay m acute care, the DHCF
reasonably demed reimbursement to the hospital. South Davis Community Hosp v Department of Health, 860 P.2d 979 (Utah Ct App
1994)

Resource preservation.
Utah does not have a "resource spend down"
provision in its Medicaid plan, nor any statement of policy expressing a desire to preserve
the resources of potential beneficiaries. Utah's
statutes seem to evince a legislative concern for
economy and efficiency in the Medicaid program, not the preservation of applicants' assets,
Allen v Utah Dep't of Health, 829 P.2d 122
(Utah Ct App 1992), aff'd, 850 P.2d 1267 (Utah
1993)
It is not unreasonable for the division to
apply a fixed asset limit forbiddmg persons to
adjust their assets to become eligible for Medic a i d benefits Allen v Utah Dep't of Health, 850
p2d 1267 (Utah 1993)

26-18-3. Administration of Medicaid program by department — Disciplinary measures and sanctions —
Funds collected.
(1) The department shall be the single state agency responsible for the
administration of the Medicaid program in connection with the United States
Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to Title XIX of the Social
Security Act.
(2) The department shall develop implementing policy in conformity with
this chapter, the requirements of Title XIX, and applicable ^federal regulations.
(3) The department may, in its discretion, contract with the Department of
Human Services or other qualified agencies for services in connection with the
administration of the Medicaid program, including but not limited to the
determination of the eligibility of individuals for the program, recovery of
overpayments, and enforcement of fraud and abuse laws to the extent
permitted by law and quality control services.
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(4) The department shall provide, by rule, disciplinary measures and
sanctions for Medicaid providers who fail to comply with the rules and
procedures of the program, provided that sanctions imposed administratively
may not extend beyond:
(a) termination from the program;
(b) recovery of claim reimbursements incorrectly paid; and
(c) those specified in Section 1919 of Title XIX of the federal Social
Security Act.
(5) Funds collected as a result of a sanction imposed under Section 1919 of
Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act shall be deposited in the General
Fund as nonlapsing dedicated credits to be used by the division in accordance
with the requirements of that section.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-3, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 5; 1989,
ch. 165, § 1; 1990, ch. 183, § 9.
Federal Law. — Title XIX of the federal

Social Security Act is compiled as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396 et seq. Section 1919 of Title XIX is 42
U.S.C. § 1396r.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

ent. By these standards, a child's temporary
absence from home will not qualify him or her
for benefits independent of parental resources.
Bleazard v. Utah Dep't of Health Care Fin., 861
P.2d 1048 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Children
_
,
,
r
—Tempo
-Temporary absence from home.
Federal law.
Children,

Federal law.
—Temporary absence from home.
Medicaid is not intended to provide benefits
Federal law requires that eligibility for "med- to the medically needy in circumstances where
ically needy" Medicaid benefits be determined financial need is not fully demonstrated and
consistently with the methods of the Aid to where benefits would be inconsistent with reFamilies with Dependent Children program quirements for the higher priority classification
and the Supplemental Security Income Pro- of the categorically needy. Bleazard v. Utah
gram. In the case of an unemancipated child, Dep't of Health Care Fin., 861 R2d 1048 (Utah
resources include those available from a par- Ct. App. 1993).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 81 C. J.S. Social Security and Public
Welfare § 126.

Key Numbers. — Social Security and Public
Welfare «=» 241 et seq.

26-18-3.1. Medicaid expansion.
(1) The purpose of this section is to expand the coverage of the Medicaid
program to persons who are in categories traditionally not served by that
program.
(2) Within appropriations from the Legislature, the department may amend
the state plan for medical assistance to provide for eligibility for Medicaid:
(a) on or after July 1, 1994, for children 12 to 17 years old who live in
households below the federal poverty income guideline; and
(b) on or after July 1, 1995, for persons who have incomes below the
federal poverty income guideline and who are aged, blind, or disabled.
(3) (a) Within appropriations from the Legislature, on or after July 1, 1996,
the Medicaid program may provide for eligibility for persons who have
incomes below the federal poverty income guideline.
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proaty, where there had been no proceeding on
his application that was sufficiently judicial in
nature, and he had not yet had the licensing
agency's action reviewed in a utnal-type hearing." Kirk v. Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing, 815 P2d 242 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
This section requires that the district court's
review of informal adjudicative proceedings be
accomplished by holding a new trial, not just by
reviewing an informal record, thus, the district
court erred m failing to conduct a trial de novo
of proceedings of the Department of Public
Safety relating to suspension of driving pnvileges. Cordova v. Blackstock, 861 P.2d 449
(Utah Ct. App. 1993).
District court does not have discretion to
review an informal adjudicative proceeding by
any method other than a trial de novo; this rule
guarantees the district court the opportunity to
correct any deficiencies that may arise because
of the informal nature of administrative proceedings and provides an adequate record for

future review Archer v Board of State Lands &
Forestry, 907 P2d 1142 (Utah 1995).
Standard of review.
The reviewing court applies differing standards of review to an agency's legal mterpretations: first, where the Legislature has explicitly
or implicitly delegated discretion to the agency
to interpret or apply that law, an intermediate
deference standard of review is applied; second,
where there is no explicit delegation of discretion and the issues are questions of constitut l 0 n a i j a w and s t a tutorv construction, the court
reV iews the agency's decision for correctness,
Elks L^g
N o s . 7 1 9 & 2 021 v. Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control, 905 P.2d 1189
(Utah 1995)
Cited in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance
v Board of State Lands & Forestry, 830 P.2d
233 (Utah 1992); Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1045 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993).

63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by
the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten,
summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any
statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
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(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decisionmaking process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency
justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, e n a c t e d by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988. ch. 72, § 26.
Cross-References. — Review of proceed-

ings before State Tax Commission, jurisdiction
and standard, §§ 59-1-601, 59-1-610.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
judicial review. It does not affect the degree of
deference an appellate court grants to an agency's decision. Rather, it ensures that relief
should not be granted when, although the
agency committed error, the error was harmless. Morton Int'i, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah
State Tax Commn, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).
The ground for relief provided by Subsection
(4Kg) cannot be invoked to mount a facial
challenge to an interpretive guideline used by
an agency in its decision-making process.
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Serv.
C o m m n , 861 P.2d 414 (Utah 1993).

ANALYSIS

Agency action.
Applicability of section.
Arbitrary action.
Conflicting evidence.
Exhaustion of remedies.
Factual findings.
Final order.
Function of district court.
Jurisdictional hearing by board.
Prior practice.
Review.
Standard of review.
— Interpretation of statute.
— Questions of law.
Substantial evidence test.
Substantial prejudice.
Whole record test.
Cited.
A g e n c y action.
Whether the industrial commission acted
contrary to its own rule was governed by Subsection (4)(h)(ii) of this section. Ashcroft v. Industrial Commn, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah Ct. App.
1993), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993).
The tax commission's failure to detail how
federal restraints on the use of subsidized property should be assessed was not sufficient h a r m
to the property owners to justify relief, when
the only harm the owners alleged was that
counties performing future assessments on
subsidized housing would ignore the restraints.
Alta Pac. Assocs. v. Utah State Tax Commn,
931 P.2d 103 (Utah 1997).
Applicability of s e c t i o n .
Subsection (4) deals with judicial relief, not

Arbitrary action.
Industrial commissions denial of occupational disease disability benefits based upon a
solitary finding regarding the ultimate issue of
causation failed to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions
of mixed fact and law. were reached, and therefore rendered the action arbitrary. Adams v.
Board of Review. 821 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
Conflicting e v i d e n c e .
In undertaking a review, the appellate court
will not substitute its judgment as between two
reasonably conflicting views, even though the
court might have come to a different conclusion
had the case come before it for de novo review.
It is the province of the board, not appellate
courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and
where inconsistent inferences can be drawn
from the same evidence, it is for the board to
draw the inferences. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board
of Review. 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Appellate court refers to the assessment by
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nical portion of clinical laboratory and radiology
services, and medical social services. These services
shall be furnished by the hospital.
(2) Drugs and biologicals, approved by the federal
Food and Drug Administration and appropriate for
inpatient care, are covered Medicaid services based
on individual need and a physician's written order.
(3) Supplies, appliances, and equipment required
for the care and treatment of a client during an
inpatient stay are covered Medicaid services based
on individual need and a physician's written order.
(4) Inpatient hospital intensive physical rehabilitation services are covered Medicaid services, as
specified in R414-2B.
(5) Organ transplantation services are covered
Medicaid services, as specified in R414-10A.
(6) Inpatient hospital psychiatric services are covered Medicaid services only when the severity of a
patient's illness and the intensity of service required
are such that these services cannot be provided in an
alternative setting.
(7) Cosmetic, reconstructive, or plastic surgery is
limited to:
(a) correction of a congenital anomaly;
(b) restoration of body form following an accidental injury; or
(c) revision of severe disfiguring and extensive
scars resulting from neoplastic surgery.
(8) Inpatient hospital care for treatment of alcoholism or drug dependency is limited to medical
treatment of symptoms associated with drug or
alcohol detoxification.
(9) Abortion procedures are limited to those certified as medically necessary, approved by division
consultants, and determined to meet the requirements of Section 26-18-4 and 42 CFR 441.203 (October 1, 1991, edition), which is incorporated by
reference.
(10) Sterilization and hysterectomy procedures
are limited to those t h a t meet the requirements of
42 CFR 441, Subpart F (October 1, 1991, edition),
which is incorporated by reference.
R414-2A-500. Limitations.
(1) Treatment of syndromes or disorders for which
no specific therapies have been identified except for
therapies that border on behavior modification or
experimental or unproven practices, or for which
medical necessity, appropriate utilization, and cost
effectiveness cannot be assured, are not covered
Medicaid services. The treatments are:
(a) treatment of sleep apnea, or sleep studies, or
both;
(b) pain clinic services;
(c) treatment of eating disorders.
(2) Miscellaneous supplies, dressings, durable
medical equipment, and drugs are not covered takehome supplies.
(3) Cosmetic, reconstructive, and plastic surgery
procedures other t h a n those specified in R414-2A400(7), including all related services, supplies, and
any institutional costs, are not covered Medicaid
services.
6

(4) An inpatient admission for 24 hours or m
solely for observation or diagnostic evaluation is
a covered Medicaid service.
(5) Nonphysician psychosocial counseling servi
are not covered Medicaid services.
(6) An off-unit pass is limited to an inpati
rehabilitation or psychiatric admission pursuant
a written order by the attending physician, pla
by the physician or interdisciplinary team thro
established goals and objectives, and adequa
documented and evaluated in the progress notes
the patient's chart as supporting the patient's p*
of care.
(7) A therapeutic leave of absence is limited
inpatient rehabilitation admissions pursuant to
written order by the attending physician, pi
by the physician or interdisciplinary team
established goals and objectives, and adequa
documented and evaluated in the progress notes
the patient's chart as supporting the patient's pf
of care.
R414-2A-600. P r i o r Authorization.
(3) All services related to organ transplanta^
require prior authorization.
(4) All inpatient psychiatric and rehabilita^
services require prior authorization.
References: 26-1-5, 26-1-15, 26-18-3(2), 26-18-5(3),
18-5(4), 26-18-6.
History: 9757, AMD, 02/02/89; 11162, PRO, 11/1"
13285, AMD, 10/08/92.

R414-2B. I n p a t i e n t Hospital Intensi
P h y s i c a l R e h a b i l i t a t i o n Services.
R414-2B-100.
R414-2B-200.
R414-2B-300.
R414-2B-500.
R414-2B-600.

Authority and Purpose.
Definitions.
Program Access Requirements.
Miscellaneous Restrictions.
Prior Authorization.

R414-2B-100. A u t h o r i t y a n d P u r p o s e .
(1) This rule defines the scope of inpatient hospi
intensive physical rehabilitation services ava
to Medicaid clients who meet the level of
criteria for admission to a distinct part rehabili
tion unit in an acute-care general hospital.
(2) Inpatient hospital services are required un
Section 1901 et seq. and Section 1905(a)(1) of f'
Social Security Act, and by 42 CFR 440.10 (Oc '
1, 1991, edition). The requirement t h a t inpa^
hospital physical rehabilitation services covered ?
Utah Medicaid be provided in a distinct p a r t : ^
bilitation unit of an acute-care general hospi^
brings rehabilitation service under this author^
(3) This rule is authorized by Sections 26-1
26-1-15, and 26-18-6, and by Subsections 26-18-3(
and 26-18-5(3) and (4).
R414-2B-200. Definitions.
(1) Terms used in this rule are defined in R414-1*
and R414-2A-200.
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program if, in the prior two years, the facility's
participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs has been terminated.
B. Nurse aide training programs must be reviewed and reapproved at least every two years.
C. The competency evaluation, both written and
•kills components, may not be administered by a
skilled nursing facility which participates in Medicare nor a nursing facility which participates in
Medicaid.
D. After January 1, 1990, nursing facilities may
not use nurse aides for more than four months
unless they have completed the nurse aide training
and competency evaluation program.
E. After January 1, 1990, a nursing facility may
not permit an individual to work as a nurse aide for
monetary compensation unless the facility has
checked the credentials of the nurse aide through
the nurse aide registry.
F. Upon review of program performance standards, those programs not meeting minimum requirements and which do not provide an acceptable
plan for correcting deficiencies shall be terminated
from the program.
G. Retraining
Nurse aides who have not performed paid services
for a continuous period of 24 months since the most
recent completion of a training and competency
evaluation program shall be required to undergo
necessary retraining.
References: 26-1-4.1, 26-1-5, 26-18-3.
History: 10188, NEW, 10/17/89; 16609, 5YR, 01/01/95.
R414-7C. A l t e r n a t i v e R e m e d i e s for Nursi n g Facilities*
R414-7C-1. Authority and Purpose.
R414-7C-2. Civil Fines.
R414-7C-1. Authority and Purpose.
(1) The department conducts on-site inspections of
nursing facilities to determine compliance with state
and federal Medicaid standards. When the department finds that a nursing facility is out of compliance with requirements of participation, the department may apply remedies to eliminate deficiencies
and bring the facility into compliance.
(2) Authority to apply the remedies described in
this section is defined in the federal Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1987 (RL. 100203), which mandates compliance with requirements of participation for the Medicaid program,
and in Section 26-18-3 of the Utah Code Annotated
1953. Section 1919(h) of the Social Security Act
specifies remedies available to a state when a skilled
nursing facility (SNF) or nursing facility (NF) is out
of compliance with the requirements for participation in the Medicaid program. This section requires
the state to ensure prompt compliance, and it further specifies that the available remedies are in
addition to other remedies available under state or
18

federal law and, except for fines, are imposed prior
to the conduct of a hearing.
(3) This rule establishes criteria for the imposition
of remedies authorized by statute.
(4) The department adopts and incorporates by
reference the regulations in 42 CFR, Part 488Survey, Certification, and Enforcement Procedures,
as amended in the Federal Register for November
10,1994, 59 FR 56237.
R414-7C-2. Civil Fines.
(1) Interest shall be assessed on the unpaid balance of the fine, beginning on the due date. The
interest rate charged shall be the average of the
bond equivalent of the weekly 90-day U.S. treasury
bill auction rates during the period for which interest will be charged.
(2) Disposition of Fines Collected.
(a) The department shall deposit fines and corresponding interest collected from Medicaid certified
facilities in the General Fund in accordance with
Section 26-18-3(5).
(b) Fines collected by the department must be
applied in accordance with Section 1919 of the act
for the protection of the health and property of
residents.
References: 26-1-4.1, 26-1-5, 26-18-3.
History: 12370, NEW, see CFR; 12370, CFR, 04/15/92;
17069, EMR, 07/01/95; 17348, EMR, 10/27/95; 17349,
AMD, 12/20/95.
R414-10. P h y s i c i a n S e r v i c e s .
R414-10-1.
R414-10-2.
R414-10-3.
R414-10-4.
R414-10-5.

Introduction and Authority.
Definitions.
Client Eligibility Requirements.
Program Access Requirements.
Service Coverage.

R414-10-1. Introduction and Authority.
(1) The Physician Services Program provides a
scope of physician services to meet the basic medical
needs of eligible Medicaid recipients. It encompasses
the art and science of caring for those who are ill
through the practice of medicine or osteopathy defined in Title 58, Chapter 12, UCA.
(2) Physician services are a mandatory Medicaid,
Title XEX, program authorized by Sections 1901 and
1905(aXl) of the Social Security Act, 42 CFR 440.50,
October 1994 edition, and Sections 26-1-5 and 2618-3, UCA.
R414-10-2. Definitions.
In addition to the definitions in R414-1-1, the
following definitions apply to this rule:
(1) "Childhood health evaluation and care*
(CHEC) means the Utah-specific term for the federally mandated program of early and periodic screening, diagnosis, and treatment for children under the
age of 21.
(2) "Client" means an individual eligible to receive
covered Medicaid services from an enrolled Medicaid provider.
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(3) "Cognitive services* means non-invasive diagnostic, therapeutic, or preventive office visits, hospital visits, therapy, and related nonsurgical services.
(4) "Covered Medicaid service" means service
available to the eligible Medicaid client within the
constraints of Medicaid policy and criteria for approval of service.
(5) "Current Procedural Terminology" (CPT)
means the manual published by the American Medical Association that provides a systematic listing
and coding of procedures and services performed by
physicians and simplifies the reporting of services,
which is adopted and incorporated by reference.
Some limitations are addressed in R414-26.
(6) "Early and periodic screening, diagnosis, and
treatment (EPSDT) means the federally mandated
program for children under the age of 21.
(7) "Family planning" means diagnosis, treatment, medications, supplies, devices, and related
counseling in family planning methods to prevent or
delay pregnancy.
1S> "Health Common Procedures Coding System"
(HCPCS) means a system mandated by the Health
Care Financing Administration to code procedures
and services. This system utilizes the CPT Manual
for physicians, and individually developed service
codes and definitions for nonphysician providers.
The coding system is used to provide consistency in
determining payment for services provided by physicians and noninstitutional providers.
(9) "Intensive, inpatient hospital rehabilitation
service" means an intense rehabilitation program
provided in an acute care general hospital through
the services of a multidistipHnary, coordinated,
team approach directed toward improving the ability of the patient to function.
(10) "Package surgical procedures" means preoperative office visits and preparation, the operation,
local infiltration, topical or regional anesthesia
when used, and the normal, uncomplicated follow-up care extending up to six weeks post-surgery.
(11) "Patient" means an individual who is receiving covered professional services provided or directed by a licensed practitioner of the healing arts
enrolled as a Medicaid provider.
(12) "Personal supervision" means the critical observation and guidance of medical services by a
physician of a. nonpnyskaan's activities within t h a t
nonphysician's licensed scope of practice.
(13) "Physician services," whether furnished in the
office, the recipient's home, a hospital, a skilled
nursing facility, or elsewhere, means services provided:
(a) within the scope of practice of medicine or
osteopathy, and
(b) by or under the personal supervision of an
individual licensed to practice medicine or osteopathy.
(14) "Prior authorization" means the required approval for provision of a service, that the provider
must obtain from the Department before providing
that service.
July 1, 1996
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(15) "Professional component" means that part of
laboratory or radiology service that may be provided
only by the physician pathologist or radiologist to
complete the analysis of a procedure or service and
provide a written report of findings.
(16) "Provider* means an entity or a licensed
practitioner of the healing arts providing approved
Medicaid services to patients undisr a provider
agreement with the Department
(17) "Services" means the types of medical assistance specified in Sections 1905(aXl) through (18) of
the Social Security Act and interpreted in 42 CFR
440, October 1994 edition, which are adopted and
incorporated by reference.
(18) Technical component" means that part of
laboratory or radiology service necessary to secure a
specimen and prepare it for analysis, or to take an
x-ray and prepare it for reading and interpretation.
R414-10-3. Client Eligibility Requirements.
Physician services are available to categorically
and medically needy eligible mdividuals.
R4 J.4-10-4. P r o g r a m Access Requirements.
(1) Physician services are available only from a
physician who meets all requirements necessary to
participate in the Utah Medicaid Program and who
has signed a provider agreement.
(2) Physician services are available only from a
physician who renders medically necessary physician services in accordance with his specific provider
agreement and with Department rulea*.
(3) An eligible Medicaid client may seek physician
services from:
(a) a physician in private practice who is an
enrolled Medicaid provider,
(b) a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO)
that has a contract with the Department;
(c) a federally qualified community health center;
or
(d) any other organized practice setting recognized
by the Department for providing physician services.
R4J4-10-5. Service Coverage,
(J.) Physician services involve direct patient care
and securing and supervising appropriate diagnostic
ancillary tests or services in order to diagnose the
existence, nature, or extent of illness, injury; or
disability. In addition, physician services involve
estsh&shi&g * COQTM of medically aece&aary treatment designed to prevent or rninimize the adverse
effects of human disease, pain, illness, injury, infirmity, deformity, or other impairments to a client's
physical or mental health.
(2) Physician services may be provided, only within
the parameters of accepted medical practice and are
subject to limitations and exclusions established by
the Department on the basis of medical necessity,
appropriateness, and utilization control considerations.
(3) Program limitations and noncovered services
are established by specific program policy maintained in the Physician Provider Manual and updated by notification through Medicaid Provider
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Bulletins. Following is a general Est of medical and
health care services excluded from coverage:
(a) Services rendered during a period the recipient
was ineligible for Medicaid;
(b) Services medically unnecessary or unreasonable;
(c) Services which fail to meet existing standards
of professional practice, or which are currently professionally unacceptable;
(d) Services requiring prior authorization, but far
which such authorization was not received;
(e) Services, elective in nature, based on patient
request or individual preference rather than medical
necessity;
(f) Services fraudulently claimed;
(g) Services which represent abuse or overuse;
(h) Services rejected or disallowed by Medicare
when the rejection was based upon any of the
reasons listed above.
(4) Experimental or medically unproven physician
services or procedures are excluded from coverage.
Criteria established and approved by the Department staff and physician consultants are used to
identify noncovered services and procedures. Policy
statements developed by the Department of Health
and Human Services, Health Care Financing Administration, Coverage Issues Bureau, are also used
to determine Department policy for noncovered services.
(5) Certain services are excluded from coverage
because medical necessity, appropriate utilization,
and cost effectiveness of the services cannot be
assured. A variety of lifestyle factors contribute to
the 'syndromes 9 associated with such services, and
there is no specific therapy or treatment identified
except for those that border on behavior modification, experimental, or unproven practices. Services
include:
(a) Sleep apnea or sleep studies, or both;
(b) Pain clinics; and
(c) Eating disorders clinics.
(6) When a service or procedure does not qualify
for coverage under the Medicaid program because it
is an elective cosmetic, reconstructive, or plastic
surgery, all related services, supplies, and institutional costs are excluded from coverage.
(7) Medications for appetite suppression, surgical
procedures, unproven or experimental treatments,
or educational, nutritional support programs for the
treatment of obesity or weight control, are excluded
from coverage.
(8) Cognitive or Office Services:
(a) Cognitive services by a provider are limited to
one service per client per day. These services are
defined as office visits, hospital visits except for
those following a package surgical procedure,
therapy visits, and other types of nonsurgical services. When a second office visit for the same problem or a hospital admission occurs on the same date
as another service, the physician shall combine the
services as one service and select a procedure code
that indicates the overall care given.
20

(b) Routine physical examinations, not part of an
otherwise medically necessary service, are excluded
from coverage, except in the following circumstances:
(i) Preschool and school age children, including
those who are EPSDT (CHEC) eligible, participating
in the ongoing CHEC program of scheduled services
and follow-up care.
(ii) New patients seeing a physician for the first
time with an initial complaint where a comprehensive physical examination, including a medical and
social history, is necessary.
,,(iii) Medically necessary examinations associated
with birth control medication, devices, and instructions.
(c) Family planning services may be provided only
by or under the supervision of a physician and only
to individuals of childbearing age, including sexually active minors. The following services are excluded from coverage as family planning services:
(i) Experimental or unproven medical procedures,
practices, or medication.
(ii) Surgical procedures for the reversal of previous elective sterilization, both male and female.
(iii) Infertility studies.
(iv) In-vitro fertilization.
(v) Artificial insemination.
(vi) Surrogate motherhood, including all services,
tests, and related charges.
(vii) Abortion, except where the life of the mother
would be endangered if the fetus were carried to
term, or where pregnancy is the result of rape or
incest.
(d) After-hours service codes may be used only by
a private physician, primary care provider, who
responds to treat a patient in the physician's private
office for a medical emergency, accident, or injury
after regular office hours. Only one of the after hours
CPT codes may be used per visit.
(e) Only the laboratory tests in the following list
are covered as part of a physician's office service. An
independent laboratory shall provide all other laboratory services. The independent laboratory completing the service must bill the Department directly
to receive payment for the service.
(i) 81000 Urinalysis by reagent strips, any number
of components: with microscopy;
(ii) 81002 Urinalysis without microscopy;
(iii) 82270 Blood: occult, feces, screening;
(iv) 82948 Glucose: blood, stick test;
(v) 84702 Gonadotropin, chorionic: quantitative;
(vi) 84703 Gonadotropin, chorionic: qualitative;
(vii) 85007 Blood count: manual differential WBC
(includes RBC morphology and platelet estimation);
(via) 85014 Blood count: hematocrit;
(ix) 85021 Blood count: hemogram, automated
(RBC, WBC, HgB, Hct and indices only);
(x) 85022 Blood count: hemogram, automated, and
manual differential WBC count (CBC);
(xi) 85023 Blood count: hemogram and platelet
count, automated, and manual differential WBC
count (CBC);
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(rii) 85024 Blood count: hemogram and platelet
count, automated, and automated partial differential WBC count (CBC);
(xiii) 85025 Blood count: hemogram and platelet
count, automated, and automated complete differential WBC count (CBC);
(xiv) 85027 Blood count: hemogram and platelet
count, automated;
(xv) 85031 Blood count: hemogram, manual, complete CBC (RBC, WBC, HgB, Hct, differential and
indices);
(xvi) 85048 Blood Count: white blood cell (WBC);
(xvii) 85650 Sedimentation rate (ESR): Wintrobe
type;
(xviii) 85651 Sedimentation rate: Westergren
type;
(xix) 86300 Heterophile antibodies: screening (includes monotype test) slide or tube;
(xz) 86317 Immunoassay for infectious agent antigen or antibody, each;
(xxi) 86403 Particle agglutination, rapid test for
infectious agent, each antigen;
(xrii) 86580 Skin test: tuberculosis, intradermal;
(xariii) 86585 Skin test: tuberculosis, tine test;
(xxiv) 87081 Culture, bacterial, screening only, for
single organisms;
(xxv) 87082 Culture, presumptive, pathogenic organisms, screening only, by commercial kit; for
single organisms;
(xxvi) 87210 Smear, primary source: wet mount
with simple stain, for bacteria, fungi, ova, and
parasites;
(xxvii) 87220 Tissue examination for fungi (e.g.,
ElOH slide).
(f) In addition to the above laboratory services, the
following services are covered when a private physician personally collects the specimen:
(i) 85095 Bone marrow smear or cell block or both:
aspiration only;
(ii) 85102 Bone marrow biopsy, needle or trocar.
(g) A specimen collection fee is covered for service
in a physician's office only when a specimen is to be
sent to an outside laboratory, and the physician or
one of his office staff under his personal supervision
actually extracts the specimen from a patient, and
only by one of the following procedures:
(i) Drawing a blood sample through venipuncture,
Le., inserting into a vein a needle with syringe or
vacutainer to draw the specimen; or
(ii) Collecting a urine sample by catheterization.
(h) Eye examinations are covered, but only once
each calendar year.
(i) Contact lenses are covered only for aphakia,
nystagmus, keratoconus, severe corneal distortion,
cataract surgery, and in those cases where visual
acuity cannot be corrected to at least 20/70 in the
better eye.
(9) Psychiatric Services:
(a) Psychiatric services or psychosocial diagnosis
and counseling are specialty medical services. Psychiatric services, whether in a private office, a group
practice, or private clinic setting, may only be proJuly 1,1996
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vided directly and documented and billed to the
Department by the private physician. Charting and
documentation must clearly reflect the private physician's direct provision of care.
(b) Nonphysician psychosocial coumseling services
are excluded from coverage as a Medicaid benefit
The personal supervision policy, R414-45-1, may not
be applied to psychiatric services.
(c) Admission to a general hospital for psychiatric
care by a physician requires prior autliorization and
is limited to those cases determined by established
criteria and utilization review standards to be of a
severity that appropriate intensity of service cannot
be provided in any alternate setting.
(10) Laboratory and Radiology Services:
(a) Laboratory services identified by CPT codes
80000 through 89999, and radiology services identified by CPT codes 70000 through 79999 are ancillary
medical services with both a technical and professional component The professional component, e.g.,
analysis, interpretation and written report, represented by modifier 26, may be provided only by a
pathologist or a radiologist practicing m an independent or hospital laboratory or radiology setting.
Private physicians who are not pathologists or radiologists may not mil for the service described by
modifier 26 for telling a patient the results of laboratory or radiology procedures as noted on the
laboratory or radiology printout or the written report Providing such information to the patient is
part of the office call rather than a separate service.
(b) Physicians prepared in a highly specialized
field of practice, e.g., neurology or neurosurgery, who
provide consultation and diagnostic radiology services in an independent setting at the request of a
private physician may bill for both the technical and
professional component of the radiology service.
(11) Hospital Services:
(a) A patient hospitalized for nonsurgical services
may require more than one visit per clay because of
the patient's condition and treatment; needs. Since
physician visits are limited to one per day, the
physician shall select one procedure code to define
the overall care given. If intensive care services are
provided, or critical care service codes are used to
define service provided, the Department requires
additional documentation from the physician. The
medical record must show documentation of medical
necessity and result of the additional service.
(b) If, for the convenience of the physician and not
for medical necessity, a patient is transferred between physicians within the same hospital or from
one hospital to another hospital, both physicians
may only use subsequent hospital care; service codes
to define and bill for services provided. Under this
policy limitation, services associated with the following codes are excludedfiromcoverage as a Medicaid
benefit:
(i) Consultation; and
(ii) Initial hospital care services.
(c) Treatment of alcoholism or drug dependency in
an inpatient setting is limited to acute care for
detoxification only.
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(12) Abortion, Sterilization and Hysterectomy:
(d) Procedures exempt from the "package* defini(a) Abortion procedures are limited only to those tion are identified in the CPT Manual by an asterwith medical certification of necessity as described isk. The CPT Manual outlines the surgical guidein 42 CFR 441.203, October 1994 edition, which is lines which apply to documentation and billing of
adopted and incorporated by reference.
procedures marked by an asterisk.
(b) Sterilization and hysterectomy procedures are
(e) Complications, exacerbations, recurrence, or
limited to those which meet the requirements of 42 the presence of other diseases or injuries requiring
CFR 441, Subpart F, October 1994 edition, which is services concurrent with the initial surgical proceadopted and incorporated by reference.
dure during the listed period of normal follow-up
(13) Cosmetic, Plastic, or Reconstructive Services: -care, may warrant additional charges only when the
(a) Cosmetic, plastic, or reconstructive surgery record shows extensive documentation and justificaprocedures may only be covered when medically tion of additional services.
necessary to:
(f) When an additional surgical procedure is car(i) correct a congenital anomaly,
ried out within the listed period of follow-up care for
(ii) restore body form or function following an a previous surgery, the follow-up periods continue
accidental injury; or
concurrently to their normal terminations.
(iii) revise severe disfiguring and extensive scar*
(g) Preoperative examination and planning are
ring resulting from neoplastic surgery.
covered as separate services only in the following
circumstances:
(14) Surgical Services:
(a) Surgical procedures denned and coded in the
(i) When the preoperative visit is the initial visit
CPT Manual are limited by Utah Medicaid policy to for the physician and prolonged detention or evaluplace of service, to prior authorization, or are ex- ation is required to establish a diagnosis, determine
cluded from coverage. Limitations are documented the need for a specific surgical procedure, or prepare
on the Medical and Surgical Procedures Prior Au- the patient;
thorization List, reviewed and revised yearly and
(ii) When the preoperative visit is a consultation
maintained in the Physician Provider Manual and the consulting physician does not assume care
through notification by Provider Bulletins.
of the patient; or
(b) Surgical procedures are "package" services.
(iii) When diagnostic procedures, not part of the
The package service includes:
basic surgical procedure, e.g., bronchoscopy prior to
(i) the preoperative examination, initiation of the chest surgery, are provided during the immediate
hospital record, and development of a treatment preoperative period.
program either in the physician's office on the day
(h) Exploratory laparotomy procedures confirm a
before admission, or in the hospital or the physi- diagnosis and determine the extent of necessary
cian's office on the same day as admission to the treatment. A physician may request payment only if
hospital;
the exploratory procedure is the only procedure done
(ii) the operation;
during an operative session. Exploratory lapa(iii) any topical, local, or regional anesthesia; and rotomy services identified by CPT Codes 49000(iv) the normal, uncomplicated follow-up care cov- 49060 may not be billed in conjunction with any
ering the period of hospitalization and office fol- services identified by the following CPT Codes:
low-up for progress checks or any service directly 43500 - 44346 - 44600 - 45180 - 47400 - 47490 related to the surgical procedure for up to six weeks 47600 - 48999 - 49002 - 49999 - 58140 - 58285 post surgery.
58400 - 58960.
(c) Interpretation of "package" services:
(i) The services of an assistant surgeon are cov(i) A physician may not bill for an office visit the ered only on very complex surgical procedures. Proday prior to surgery, for preadmission or admission cedures not authorized for assistant surgeon coverworkup, or for subsequent hospital care while the age are listed in the Physician Provider Manual and
patient is being prepared, hospitalized, or under updated by Medicaid Provider Bulletins as necescare for a "package" surgical service.
sary. Medicare guidelines for limitation of assistant
(ii) Consultation services may be billed by the surgeon coverage are used, since those decisions are
consulting physician only when consultation and no made at the national level with physician consultaother service is provided. When a consulting physi- tion.
cian admits and follows a patient, independently or
(15) Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedures:
concurrently with the primary physician, only ad(a) Diagnostic needle procedures, e.g., lumbar
mission codes and subsequent care codes may be puncture, thoracentesis, and jugular, femoral vein,
used.
or subdural taps, when performed as part of a
(iii) Office visits for up to six weeks following the necessary workup for a serious medical illness or
hospitalization which relate to the same diagnosis injury, are covered in addition to other medical care
are part of the "package" service. The only exception on the same day.
to either inpatient or office service is for service
(b) Diagnostic "oscopy" procedures, e.g., endosrelated to complications, exacerbations, or recur- copy, bronchoscopy, and laparoscopy, are covered
rence of other diseases or problems requiring addi- separately from any major surgical procedure. Howtional or separate service.
ever, when an "oscopy" procedure is done the same
22
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day or at the same operative session as another
procedure, the "oscopy" procedure may only be covered as a multiple procedure.
(c) Magnetic resonance Tmngmg (MRI) is covered
only for service to the brain, spinal cord, hip, thigh
and abdomen.
(d) Therapeutic needle procedures, e.g., scalp vein
insertion, injections into cavities, nerve blocks, are
covered in addition to other medical care on the
same day.
(e) Puncture of a cavity or joint for aspiration
followed by injection of a medication is covered as
one procedure and identified by specific CPT code.
(16) Anesthesia Services:
Anesthesia services are covered only when administered by a licensed anesthesiologist or nurse anesthetist who remains in attendance for the sole purpose of rendering general anesthesia services.
Standby or monitoring by the anesthesiologist or
anesthetist during local anesthesia is not a covered
Medicaid anesthesia service.
(17) Transplant Services
Organ transplant services are limited to those
procedures for which selection criteria have been
approved and documented in R414-10A.
(18) Modifiers:
Modifiers may be used only, as defined in the CPT
Manual, to show that a service or procedure has
been altered to some degree but not changed in
definition or code. The following limitations apply:
(1) The professional component, modifier 26, may
be used only with laboratory and radiology service
codes by a pathologist or radiologist and only when
direct analysis, interpretation, and written report of
findings are provided on a laboratory or radiology
procedure. Private physicians may not use this
modifier.
(2) Unusual services are identified by use of modifier 22, along with the appropriate CPT code. A
prepayment review of unusual services shall be
completed by Medicaid professional staff or physician consultants. A report of the service and any
important supporting documentation must be submitted with the claim for review.
(3) Anesthesia by surgeon is identified by use of
modifier 47. The operating surgeon may not use
modifier 47 in addition to the basic procedure code.
Anesthesia provided by the surgeon is part of the
basic procedure being provided.
(4) Mandated services as defined by CPT and
identified by modifier 32 are noncovered services.
(5) Reference laboratory services identified by
modifier 90 are noncovered services.
(19) Medications:
(a) DrugB and biologicals are limited to those
approved by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). Medicaid coverage of drugs and biologicals is
based on individual need and orders written by a
physician when the drug is given in accordance with
accepted standards of medical practice and within
the protocol of accepted use for the drug.
(i) Generic drugs shall be used whenever a generic
product approved by the FDA is available. If the
July 1, 1996
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physician determines that a brand name drug is
medically necessary, the physician may override the
generic requirement by writing on the prescription
in his own hand writing "name brand medically
necessary9. Preprinted messages, abbreviations, or
notations by a second party, do not meet the override
requirement. The pharmacist shallfiJilthe prescription with the generic equivalent product if the override procedure is not followed.
(ii) Injectable medications approved in HCPCS are
identified in the "J" code list published by the Health
Care Financing Administration or the Department,
or both. The list is reviewed and revised yearly and
maintained in the Physician Provider Manual by
notification and update through Medicaid Provider
Bulletins.
(iii) The "J" code covers only the cost of an approved product
(iv) Office visits only for administration of medication are excluded from coverage. However, an
injection code which covers the cost of the syringe,
needle and administration of the medication may be
used with the "J* code when medication administration is the only reason for an office call.
(v) When an office service is provided for other
purposes, in addition to medication administration,
only the office visit and a "J" code may be used to bill
for the service provided.
(vi) The office visit code and injection code may
never be used together. Only one of the codes may be
used to define the service provided.
(vii) Vitamin B-12 is limited to use only in treating
conditions where physiological mechanisms produce
pernicious anemia. Use of Vitamin B-12 in treating
any unrelated condition is excluded from coverage.
(b) Vitamins may be provided only for:
(i) Pregnant women: Prenatal vitamins with 1 mg
folic acid.
(ii) Children through age five: Children's vitamins
with fluoride.
(iii) Children through age 15: Fluoride supplement.
(c) Human growth stimulating hormones are not a
covered service.
(d) Methylphenidates, amphetamines, and other
central nervous system stimulants require prior
authorization and may be provided only for treatment ofAttention Deficit Disorder (ADD) in children
between the ages of six and 18 years.
(e) Medications for appetite suppression are not a
covered service.
(f) Non-prescription, over-the-counter items are
limited, and notification of changes consistent with
this rule is made by Provider Bulletin and Provider
Manual updates.
(g) Nutrients may be provided only as established
inR414-24A.
References: 26-1-5, 26-18-3.
History: 11442, NEW, see CPR; 11442, CPR, 04/15/91;
17705, AMD, 06/07/96.
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g. Vitamin B-12 is limited to use only in treating
conditions where physiological mechanisms produce
pernicious anemia. Use of Vitamin B-12 in treating
any unrelated condition is excluded from coverage.
2. Vitamins may be provided only for:
a. Pregnant women: Prenatal vitamins with 1 mg
folic acid.
b. Children through age 5: Childrens' vitamins
with fluoride.
c. Children through age 15: Fluoride supplement.
3. Human growth stimulating hormones are not a
covered Medicaid benefit.
4. Methylphenidates, amphetamines, and other
central nervous system stimulants require prior
authorization and may be provided only for treatment of Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) in children
between the ages of 6 and 18 years.
5. Medications for appetite suppression are not a
benefit of the Medicaid program.
6. Non-prescription, over-the-counter items are
limited and notification of changes consistent with
this rule are made by Provider Bulletin and Provider
Manual updates.
7. Nutrients may be provided only as established
in Utah Medicaid intravenous therapy rules.

1*414-10-8. R e i m b u r s e m e n t .
A. Reimbursement for physician services may be
Provided only in accordance with a specific provider
Agreement.
B. The physician may seek reimbursement, in
Accordance with Utah Administrative Code R414^5-1 and R414-45-2, only for services that were
Personally rendered by the physician or were rendered incident to the physician's professional service
^y a physician in training, a nurse practitioner, or a
Physician assistant under personal supervision. The
Acceptable standard for personal supervision is
Availability by telephone, when the physician has a
Written protocol embodying supervisory procedures.
The personal supervision requirement must be met
Mth respect to every nonphysician service provided
**i the course of treatment prescribed by any physician for any Medicaid client. Medical charts must
Have signed documentation sufficient to reflect ac~
^ive participation
of the physician in managing,
®ro viding and supervising all aspects of patient can treatment,
v C. In accordance with Utah Administrative Code
A414-4X, payment may be made only when a covered
^rvice has been provided directly to a patient.
reimbursement may not be requested when a parent fails to keep a scheduled appointment.

M4J4-1D~7*
PriorAuthorization,
A. Selected medical and surgical procedures, as
documented in the Medical and Surgical Procedures
Prior Authorization List, and incorporated in individual provider agreements, require prior authorization.
B. Prior authorization, consent, and other supporting documentation are required for medical necessity and appropriateness of sterilization, hysterectomy and abortion procedures to be established by
the Bureau of Managed Health Care, Utilization
Management staff. This is required by 42 CFR Part
441, Subparts E and F, October 1989 edition.
C. The Medical and Surgical Procedures Prior
Authorization List, maintained in the Physician
Provider Manual and updated by Medicaid Provider
Bulletins as necessary, defines the prior authorization requirements for specific procedures referenced
in A and B above.
D. Telephone Prior Authorization is available for
selected procedures. The Medical and Surgical Procedures Prior Authorization List identifies the procedures and the requirements for telephone prior
authorization.
quire prior authorization.
F. Outpatient Psychiatric services, provided by an
individual physician provider, require prior authorization after the first 12 services in each calendar
year.
G. Surgical procedures which require prior authorization and are performed under emergency circumstances require an "after-the-fact authorization."The procedures to follow when seeking such an
authorization are found on the introductory key to
the Medical and Surgical Procedures Prior Authorization List.
24

H. All services related to organ transplant procedures require prior authorization. An "after-the-fact
Authorization"may
not be considered.
I. Intensive, inpatient hospital physical rehabilitation services require prior authorization.

References: 26-1-5, 26-18-3.
History: 11442, NEW, see CPR; 11442, CPR, 04/15/9L^
NOTES TO DECISIONS
^reast reduction surgery.
Breast reduction surgery is authorized in particular
J^ses of "medical necessity." Therefore, because the per
Rent's attending physicians testified regarding the medical
Necessity of the procedure and the Department of Health
Nare Finance failed to give a reasoned basis for declining to
>ive deference to the testimony of the treating physician,
/ne agency's finding that the breast reduction surgery waa
%t medically necessary was not supported by substantial
Vdence and was reversed. (R414-10-6.) A.M.L. v. Department of Health, Div. of Health Care Fin., 863 P.2d 44 (Utah
k App. 1993).

^414-lOA, Transplant Services Standard*.!
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and other approved services necessary to accomplish
selected transplantation.

Breast reduction surgery.
Breast reduction surgery is authorized in particular B4U-1GA-2. Authority.
cases of "medical necessity." Therefore, because the paTransplantation services for persons age 21 and
tient's attending physicianstestifiedregarding the medical over are optional Medicaid, Title XIX services. Secnecessity of the procedure and the Department of Health tion 9507 of the federal Consolidated Omnibus BudCare Finance failed to give a reasoned basis for declining to
give deference to the testimony of the treating physician, get Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), codified as
the agency'sfindingthat the breast reduction surgery was section 1903(iXD of the Social Security Act, requires
not medically necessary was not supported by substantial states, as part of the Medicaid program, to establish
evidence and was reversed. CR414-10-6.) A.M.L. v. Depart- standards for coverage of transplantation services.
ment of Health, Div. of Health Care Fin^ 863 R2d 44 (Utah Medically necessary transplantation services are
Ct. App. 1993).
mandated by section 1905(rX5) of the Sodal Security Act, for persons under age 21.
R414-10A. .Transplant S e r v i c e s S t a n d a r d s .
R4U-10A-3. Definitions.
For purposes of R414-10A:
R414-10A-1. Policy Statement.
R414-10A-2. Authority.
(1) "Abstinence" means the documented non-use of
JU14-1DA-3. Detentions.
any abusable psychoactive substance.
R414-10A-4. Client Eligibility. Requirements for Coverage
(2) "Active infection* means current presumptive
for Transplantation Services.
evidence of invasion of tissue or body fluids by
R414-10A-5. Program Access Requirements.
bacteria, viruses, fungi, rickettsiae, or parasites
R414-1QA-6. Service Coverage.
which is not demonstrated to be effectively conR414-10A-7. Prior Authorization.
R414-1QA-3. Criteria for Transplantation Centers or Fa- trolled by the host, antibiotic or antimicrobial
agents.
cilities.
R414-10A-9. Criteria and Contraindications for Cornea
(3) "Age group" means patients documented in the
Transplantation.
medical literature with an age at the time of transR414-1QA-10. Criteria and Contraindications for Bone plantation related to the current age of the client as
Marrow Transplantation.
listed below:
R414-1QA-11. Criteria and Contraindications for Heart
(a) Birth through 12 months;
Transplantation.
(b) One through 12 years;
R414-10A-12. Criteria and Contraindications for Intestine
(c) 13 through 20 years;
Transplantation.
(d) 21 through 30 years;
R414-1QA-13. Criteria and Contraindications for Kidney
(e) 31 through 40 years; or
Transplantation.
R414-1QA-14. Criteria and Contraindications for liver
(f) 41 through 54 years.
Transplantation.
(g) Department medical consultants may consider
R414-10A-15. Criteria and Contraindications for Lung othejr age groups, documented by the medical literaTransplantation.
ture and the transplant center to have conclusive
R414-1QA-16. Criteria and Contraindications for Pancreas relevance to the client's survival
Transplantation.
(4) "Active substance abuse* means the current
R414-10A-17. Criteria and Contraindications for Small
use of any abusable psychoactive substance which is
Bowel Transplantation.
R414-10A-18. Criteria and Contraindications for Heart not appropriately prescribed and taken under the
direction of a physician or is not medically indicated.
and Lung Transplantation.
R414-10A-19. Criteria and Contraindications for Intestine
(5) "Allogenic* means having a different genetic
and Liver Transplantation.
constitution but belonging" to the same species.
R414-10A-20. Criteria and Contraindications for Kidney(6) 'Autologous" means the products or compoPancreas Transplantation.
nents of the same individual person.
R414-10A-21. Criteria and Contraindications for Liver
(7) "Chronic myelogenous leukemia in chronic
and Kidney Transplantation.
R414-1QA-22. Criteria and Contraindications for phaije* means chronologically the first phase of
chronic myelogenous leukemia (CML). CML is genMultivisceral Transplantation.
R414-10A-23. Criteria and Contraindications for Liver erally divided into three stages: chronic phase, accelerated phase, and blast crisis. The median duraand Small Bowel Transplantation.
R414-1QA-24. Criteria and Contraindications for Other tion of the chronic phase of CML is about 45 months,
Tissues, Organs, and Multiple Organ Transplantations but the range is wide and varies from a few months
for Clients Under The Age of 21 Years Not Specifically to m.ore than 20 years. The presence of one or more
Set Forth in This Rule.
of the following documents the end of the chronic
pha*e and the beginning of the accelerated phase:
R414-10A-1. Policy Statement.
(a) Difficulty maintaining control of the white
(1) This rule establishes standards and criteria for blood count,
tissue and organ transplantation in the treatment of
(b) Increasing numbers of blood basophils and
progressive or life threatening disease.
eosinophils,
(2) Transplantation services include inpatient
(cj Increasing percentages of marrow promyelohospital, physician, laboratory, outpatient surgical, cytes and blast cells,
24
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(d) Increasing anemia,
(e) Falling platelet count,
(f) Persistent thrombocytosis greater than
1067mm3,
(g) Karyotypic abnormalities in addition to Philadelphia chromosome,
(h) Increasing spleen size,
(i) Extramedullary disease including leukemic
nodules or chloromas,
(j) Increasing myelofibrosis,
(k) Lymphadenopathy,
(I) Bone pain,
(m) Unexplained fever,
(n) Unexplained weight loss,
(o) Night sweats,
(p) Hypercalcemia.
(8) "Client" means an individual eligible to receive
covered Medicaid services from an enrolled Medicaid provider.
(9) "Department" means the Utah Department of
Health.
(10) "Emergency transplantation" means any
transplantation which for reasons of medical necessity requires that a transplant be performed less
than five days after determination of the need for
the procedure.
(II) "End stage lung disease" means a progressive
lung disorder that results in any one of the following:
(a) Three liters per minute or more of oxygen is
required to maintain an oxygen saturation of the
hemoglobin at greater than or equal to 90 percent.
(b) PC0 2 greater than or equal to 65 mmHg. in the
arterial blood or in arterialized capillary blood
samples.
(c) Vital capacity of less than 50 percent of predicted for age, height, weight, and gender.
(d) Forced expiratory flow^^ (FEF^.^) of less
than 20 percent of predicted that is not reversible
with bronchodilators.
(e) Evidence of cor pulmonale by any one or more
of the following:
(i) EKG
(ii) Echocardiogram
(iii) Cardiac catheterization.
(12) "End stage renal disease" means:
(a) clients 19 years of age or older who have any
one or more of the following:
(i) a serum creatinine consistently above or equal
to 6 mg. per deciliter.
(ii) a serum creatinine between 4.5 and 6 mg per
deciliter with symptomatic uremia.
(iii) a serum creatinine rising one mg. per deciliter
per month.
(iv) a creatinine clearance below or equal to 8 mg.
per minute or
(v) chronic renal failure requiring renal dialysis;
or
(b) in clients 18 years of age or less, a creatinine
clearance from 10 to 15 cubic centimeters per
minute per 1.73 meters square body surface area
with symptomatic uremia, and less than 10 cubic
July 1, 1996
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centimeters per minute per 1.73 meters square body
surface area whether or not symptoms have occurred.
(13) "Intestine transplantation" means transplantation of both the small bowel and colon.
(14) "Irreversible, progressive, liver disease*
means liver disease associated with any one of the
following:
(a) a serum albumin of less than 2.6 g/dL;
(b) a persistent serum bilirubin of 8 mg/dL;
(c) a coagulopathy unresponsive to vitamin K
therapy;
(d) chronic portosystemic encephalopathy;
(e) gastric esophageal varices with Child's classification grade C, adopted and incorporated by reference; or
(f) medically refractory ascites associated with
hepatic fibrosis, or cirrhosis, or both.
(15) "Medical literature" means jarticles and medical information which have been |>eer reviewed and
accepted for publication or published.
(16) "Medically necessary" means a client's medical condition which meets all the criteria and none of
the contraindications for the type of transplantation
requested.
(17) "Morbid obesity" means the weight equal to or
greater than the values specified in Table I for males
and Table II for females found at 20 CFR 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1, Section 10.10, April 1992
edition, which is hereby incorporated by reference.
(18) "Multiple transplantations1 means, except for
corneas, the transplantation of more than one tissue
or organ during the same or different operative
procedure.
(19) "Multivisceral transplantation" means the
transplantation of liver, pancreas, omentum, stomach, small intestine and colon.
(20) "Patient" means a client who is receiving
covered professional services provided or directed by
a licensed practitioner of the healing arts enrolled as
a Medicaid provider.
(21) "Remission" means the lack of any evidence of
the leukemia on physical examination and hematological evaluation, including normocellular bone
marrow with less than five percent blast cells, and
peripheral blood counts within normal values, except for clients who are receiving maintenance chemotherapy.
(22) "Services" means the type of medical assistance specified in sections 1905(a)(1) through (24) of
the Social Security Act and interpreted in the 42
CFR Section 440, Subpart A, October 1992 edition,
which is adopted and incorporated by reference.
(23) "Substance abuse rehabilitation program"
means a rehabilitation program developed and conducted by an inpatient facility that, at a minimum,
meets the standards of organization and staff of a
chemical dependency/substance abuse specialty hospital specified in R432-102-4,5.
(24) "Syngeneic" means possessing identical genotypes, as monozygotic or identical twins.
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(25) Transplantation" means the transfer of a
human organ or tissue from one person to another or
from one site to another in the same individual,
except for skin and bone.
(26) "Vital end-organs* means organs of the body
essential to life, e.g., the heart, the liver, the lungs,
and the brain.
R414-1QA-4. Client Eligibility Requirements
for Coverage for Transplantation Services.
- - Transplantation services are available to categorically eligible and medically needy individuals who
are Title XIX eligible and meet criteria established
in R414-10A-7 through 24 at the time the transplantation service is provided.
R414-10A-5. Program Access Requirements.
(1) Transplantation services may be provided only
for those eligible clients who meet the criteria established by R414-10A-7 through 24 for services covered under the Utah Medicaid program.
(2) Transplantation services for the organ needed
by the client may be provided only in a transplant
center approved by the United States Department of
Health and Human Services as a Medicare designated center or by the Department in accordance
with criteria in R414-10A-8.
(3) Transplantation services may be provided outof-state only when the authorized service is not
available in an approved facility in the state of Utah.
(4) Criteria established by R414-10A applicable to
transplantation services and transplant centers in
the state of Utah also apply to out-of-state transplant services and facilities.
(5) Post transplant authorization for transplantation services provided under unusual, emergency
circumstances may be given only when:
(a) all Utah Medicaid criteria established by R41410A-7 through 24 are met; and
(b) both the transplant center and the boardcertified specialist evaluation required by .E41410A-7(4)(f), (p), (q), and (r) are submitted with the
recommendation that the tissue or organ transplantation be authorized.
(6) Telephone prior authorization for corneal
transplantation or penetrating keratoplasty may be
given only when the client's referring physician
provides:
(a) the information required by R414-10A-7(4Xa)
and(b),
(b) the information required by R414-10AKlXfXi) and (ii),
(c) the information required by R414-10A-9Q) and
(2), and
(d) any additional medical information that could
affect outcome of the corneal transplantation which
is requested for review by the Department.
(7) Telephone Prior Authorization for corneal
transplantation or penetrating keratoplasty must be
followed by the written Prior Authorization Request
Form 24-06-37, completed and signed by the physician. The written request, with the supporting documentation required by R414-10A-9, must be re26

ceived by the Department before payment will be
made.
R414-10A-6. Service Coverage.
(1) Transplantation services are covered by the
Utah Medicaid program only when criteria established by R414-10A-7 through 24 are met.
(2) Transplantations which are experimental or
investigational or which are performed on an experimental or investigational basis.
(3) Multiple transplantation services may be provided only when the criteria for the specific multiple
transplantations are met.
(4) Staff shall not consider criteria for single tissue
or organ transplantation in reviewing requests for
multiple transplantations.
(5) Transplantation of additional tissues or organs, different from prior transplantations, may be
provided only when the criteria for multiple transplantations of all provided or scheduled multiple
tissue or organ transplantations are met.
(6) Repeat transplantations of the same tissues or
organs may be provided only when documentation
reviewed by Department staff and medical consultants shows that criteria for transplantation of the
specific tissues or organs are met
(7) Emergency transplantations may be provided
only when the service is provided for a transplantation with criteria approved in R414-10A-7 through
24. Payment will not be made until Department
staff has reviewed all of the information required by
R414-10A-7 through 24 and determined that the
patient and the transplant center met criteria for
approval and provision of the service at the time of
the transplantation.
R414-10A-7. Prior Authorization.
(1) Prior authorization is required for all transplantation services.
(2) Prior authorization for corneal transplantation
must be in accordance with R414-10A-9.
(3) The prior authorization request for transplantation services must be initiated by the client's
referring physician. Failure to submit ail required
information with the prior authorization request
will delay processing of the request for transplantation.
(4) The initial request for prior authorization of
any transplantation, except cornea, must contain all
of the following information and documentation:
(a) Request for Prior Authorization Form 24-0637, completed and signed by the physician.
(b) A description of the medical condition which
necessitates a transplantation.
(c) The client's prognosis, with and without a
transplant, including estimated life expectancy.
(d) Transplantation treatment alternatives utilized previous to the transplantation request.
(e) Transplantation treatment alternatives considered and discarded, including discussion of why
the alternatives have been discarded.
(f) Comprehensive examination, evaluation and
recommendations completed by a board-certified or
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board-eligible specialist in a field directly related to
the client's condition which necessitates the transplantation, such as a nephrologist, gastroenterologist, cardiologist, or hematologist
(g) Comprehensive psycho-social evaluation of the
client by a board-certified or board-eligible psychiatrist The evaluation must include a comprehensive
history regarding substance abuse and compliance
with medical treatment
(h) Psycho-social evaluation of parentis; or guardian(s) of the client, by a board-certified or boardeligible psychiatrist if the client is less than 18 years
of age. The psycho-social evaluation must include a
comprehensive history regarding substance abuse,
and past and present compliance with medical treatment
(i) Comprehensive psychiatric evaluation of the
client, if the client has a history of mental illness.
(j) Comprehensive psychological or developmental
testing, as requested by the Department
(k) Comprehensive infectious disease evaluation
for a client with a recent or current suspected
infectious episode.
(1) Current dental consultation.
(m) Complete blood count with differential and
platelet count, prothrombin time, partial thromboplastin time, urinalysis, SMA 20, ABO blood antibodies, human leukocyte antigen typing, arterial
blood gases, purified protein derivative skin test,
chest X-ray, pulmonary function tests, electrocardiogram, echocardiogram, urinary drug screen, titers
for toxoplasmosis, hepatitis B and C, human immunodeficiency virus, cytomegalovirus, Epstein-Barr
virus, herpes viruses, and fungi
(n) Documentation by the client's referring physician that a client with a history of substance abuse
has successfully completed a substance abuse program or has documented abstinence for a period of
at least six months before any transplantation service can be authorized.
(o) Hospital and outpatient records for at least the
last two years, unless the patient is less than two
years of age, in which case all records.
(p) Any other medical evidence needed to evaluate
possible contraindications for the type of transplantation being considered. Contraindications are listed
in this rule under each selected organ or transplant
type.
(q) The transplant center must document, by a
current medical literature review, a one-year survival rate for patients transplantation for the age
group, specific diagnosisCes), condition and type of
transplantation proposed for the client Survival
rate must be calculated by the Kaplan-Meier product-limit method or the actuarial life table method:
"Kaplan, G., Meier, P. Non-Parametric estimation
from incomplete observations. Journal of American
Statistical Association 53:457-481, 1958. Cox, D i t ,
Oakes, D. Analysis of survival data. Chapman and
Hill, 1984." adopted and incorporated by reference.
At least ten patients in the appropriate age group
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must be alive at the end of the one or three year
period to document adequate confidence intervals.
The Department shall use independent research by
staff medical consultants to evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center.
(r) The transplant center must document by a
current medical literature review, a one year graft
function rate for patients having received pancreas,
kidney or small bowel transplantation for the age
group, specific diagnosis(e8), condition, and type of
transplantation proposed for the client Graft function rate must be calculated by the Kaplan-Meier
product-limit method or the actuarial life table
method: "Kaplan, G., Meier, P. Non-Parametric estimation from incomplete observations. Journal of
American Statistical Association 53:457-481, 1958.
Cox, DJt, Oakes, D. Analysis of survival data.
Chapman and Hill, 1984." adopted and incorporated
by reference. The time to graft failure will be determined by the use of insulin post-pancreas transplantation, by the use of dialysis post-renal transplantation, and the use of total parenteral nutrition postsmall bowel transplantation. At least 10 patients in
the appropriate age group must have documented
graft function at the end of the one year period to
document adequate confidence intervals. The Department shall use independent research by staff
medical consultants to evaluate the documentation
submitted by the transplant center.
(s) Bone marrow transplantation centers must
document, by a current medical literature review, a
one-year and a three-year survival rate from patients having received transplantation for the age
group, specific diagnosis(es), condition and type of
transplantation proposed for the client The Department shall use independent research by staff medical consultants to evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center.
(t) The transplant center must provide written
recommendations for each client which support the
need for the transplant The recommendations must
reflect use of both the transplant center's own patient selection criteria and the Utah Medicaid program criteria as noted in R414-10A-9 through 24.
Agreement of the transplant center to provide the
required service must also be established.
(u) The physician must provide, for review by the
Department, any additional medical information
which could affect the outcome of the specific transplant being requested.
(v) The completed request for authorization, along
with all required information and documentation,
must be delivered to:
Utah Department of Health
Bureau of Managed Health Care
Prior Authorization Unit
Transplant Coordinator
288 North 1460 West
P.O. Box 16580
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116-0580.
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R414-1QA-8. Criteria for Transplantation Centers or Facilities.
(1) Transplantation services are covered only in a
transplant center or facility which demonstrates the
following qualifications to the Department:
(a) Compliance with criteria established by R41410A-7 through 24.
(b) The transplant center must document cost
effectiveness and quality of service. The transplant
center must complete, and submit to the Department for evaluation, documentation specific to the
surgical experience of the requesting transplant
center, showing applicable one and three year survival rates for all patients receiving transplantation
in the last three years. The Department shall use
independent research by staff medical consultants
to evaluate the documentation submitted by the
transplant center.
(c) Out-of-state transplant centers must meet all
of the criteria and requirements established by the
Department in R414-10A-7 through 24.
(d) Transplantation services are covered in out-ofstate transplant centers only when the service is not
available in an approved facility in Utah, and agreement is reached between the Department and the
requesting physician that service out-of-state is essential to the individual case.
(e) Reimbursement to out-of-state transplant centers is provided only when the transplant center and
the Department can agree upon arrangements
which reasonably conform to the Department payment methodology.
(f) Corneal transplant facilities must document:
(i) certification or licensure by the Department as
an ambulatory surgical center or an acute care
general hospital; and
(ii) that the surgeon is board-certified or boardeligible in ophthalmology.
(g) Heart, kidney, and liver transplant centers
must document all of the following:
(i) Current approval by the UJS. Department of
Health and Human Services as a Medicare-designated center for transplantation of the organ needed
by the client.
(ii) Current full membership in the United Network for Organ Sharing for the specific organ transplantation needed by the client.
(h) Bone marrow transplant centers must document the following:
(i) Approval to provide autologous or allogenic
bone marrow transplantation from at least one of
the following:
(A) Children's Cancer Study Group approval as a
bone marrow transplantation center for autologous
or allogenic bone marrow.
(B) Southwest Oncology Group approval as a bone
marrow transplantation center for autologous or
allogenic bone marrow.
(C) National Marrow Donor Program approval as
a bone marrow transplantation center for allogenic
bone marrow.
(ii) Payment will be made for autologous bone
marrow transplantation services only if the trans28

plantation center can document approval by at least
one of the agencies named in R414-10A-8(lXhXiXA)
or (B) of this rule as an approved autologous bone
marrow transplantation center.
(iii) Payment will be made for allogenic bone
marrow transplantation services only if the transplantation center can document approval by at least
one of the agencies named in R414-lQA-8(lXhXiXA)
through (C) of this rule as an approved allogenic
bone marrow transplant center.
(i) Lung transplant centers must have a current
full membership in the United Network for Organ
Sharing for lung transplantation.
R414-10A-9. Criteria and Contraindications for
Cornea Transplantation.
(1) Cornea transplantation services may be provided to a client of any age.
(2) Cornea transplantation or penetrating keratoplasty must be prior authorized by the Department.
The following documentation for prior authorization
is required:
(a) prior Authorization Request Form 24-06-37,
completed and signed by the physician;
(b) a description of the medical condition which
necessitates a transplantation; and
(c) documentation that indicates a probability of
successful clinical outcome.
(3) The following are contraindications for cornea
transplantation or penetrating keratoplasty:
(a) Active infection.
(b) The presence of an associated disease, such as
macular degeneration or diabetic retinopathy severe
enough to prevent visual improvement with a successful corneal transplantation.
R414-10A-10. Criteria a n d Contraindications
for Bone Marrow Transplantation.
(1) Bone marrow transplantation services may be
provided only for a client who is less than 21 years of
age at the time a written prior authorization application for transplantation is received by the Department.
(2) The client for bone marrow transplantation
must meet requirements of R414-10A-10(2Xa) or (b).
(a) Allogenic and syngeneic bone marrow transplantations may be approved for payment only when
the client has an HLA-matched donor. The donor
must be compatible for all or &five-out-of-sixmatch
of World Health Organization recognized HLA-A, -B,
and -DR antigens as determined by appropriate
serologic typing methodology.
(i) A search of related family members, for a
suitable donor, is authorized for payment only after
a written prior authorization request has been received by the Department.
(ii) A search of unrelated persons by HLA-type, for
a suitable donor, will not be authorized for payment
by the Department until the client has been documented to meet all other criteria in this rule for bone
marrow transplantation except an HLA-matched
donor.
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(iii) The transplant center staff must complete,
and submit to the Department for evaluation, a
current medical literature review, documenting a
TTiflYiTTtmn probability of successful clinical outcome
by having a greater than or equal to 75 percent
one-year survival rate, or by having a greater than
or equal to 55 percent three-year survival rate or by
meeting the one-year and three-year survival rates
for patients receiving bone marrow transplantation
for the age group, specific diagnosiB(es), and type of
transplantation proposed for the client The Department shall use independent research by staff medical consultants to evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center.
(b) Autologous bone marrow or peripheral blood
stem cell transplantation performed in conjunction
with total body radiation or high dose chemotherapy,
may be approved for payment only if a current
medical literature review, completed by the transplant center staff and sent to the Department for
staff review and evaluation, documenting a maximum probability of successful clinical outcome by
having a greater than or equal to 75 percent oneyear survival rate, or by having a greater than or
equal to 55 percent three-year survival rate or by
meeting the one-year and three-year survival rates
for patients receiving bone marrow transplantation
for the age group, specific diagnosis(es), and type of
transplantation proposed for the client The Department shall use independent research by staff medical consultants to evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center.
(c) Clients for autologous bone marrow transplantations must have adequate marrow function and no
evidence of marrow involvement by the primary
malignancy at the time the marrow is harvested.
(3) In addition to meeting the requirements of
R414-10A-10(2Xa) or (b), the client for bone marrow
transplantation must meet the requirements of at
least R414-10A-l<X3Xa) or (b).
(a) The client must have irreversible, progressive
bone marrow disease with a life expectancy of one
year or less without transplantation or must have
greater than a five year increase in life expectancy
with transplantation, with no other reasonable
medical or surgical alternative to transplantation
available.
(b) The transplant center staff must complete, and
submit to the Department for staff review and
evaluation, a medical literature review documenting
that the client's condition will cause irreversible,
progressive disease to vital end-organs within two
years following the application for transplant and
have no other reasonable medical or surgical alternative to transplantation available. The medical
literature must also document that the bone marrow
transplantation will prevent irreversible, progressive disease to the client's vital end-organs and must
document that it will increase the life expectancy of
the client by greater than five years. The Department shall use independent research by staff medical consultants to evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center.
July 1, 1996
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(4) In addition to meeting the requirements listed
in R414-10A-10, (1) through (3), the client must
meet all of the following requirements:
(a) Medical assessment that the client is a reasonable risk for surgery with a likelihood of tolerance
for immunosuppressive therapy.
(b) Medical assessment by the client's referring
physician that the client has sufficient mental, emotional and social stability and support to ensure that
he and his parentis) or guardian(a) will strictly
adhere to the long-term follow-up and the immunosuppressive program which is required.
(c) Psycho-social assessment by a Isoard-certified
or board-eligible psychiatrist that the client has
sufficient mental, emotional and social stability and
support to ensure that he and his parentis) or
guardian(s) will strictly adhere to the long-term
follow-up and the immunosuppressive program
which is required.
(d) The client must have a strong motivation to
undergo the procedure as documented by the medical and psycho-social assessment
(e) If the client has a history of substance abuse,
then the client must successfully complete a substance abuse program or must have documented
abstinence for a period of at least six months before
the Department reviews a request for transplantation services.
(f) A current medical literature review, completed
by the transplant center staff and submitted to the
Department for staff review and evaluation, documenting that the underlying original bone marrow
disease will not recur and limit survival to less than
75% one-year survival rate, or to less than 55%
three-year survival rate. The Department shall use
independent research by staff medical consultants
to evaluate the documentation submitted by the
transplant center.
(5) Any single contraindication listed below precludes approval for Medicaid payment for bone marrow transplantation:
(a) Active infection.
(b) Acute severe hemodynamic compromise at the
tJTTiA of transplantation if accompanied by significant compromise of one or more vital end-organs.
(c) Active substance abuse.
(d) Presence of systemic dysfunction or malignant
disease which could Emit successful clinical outcome
or interfere with compliance with a disciplined
medical regimen or rehabilitation afbsr transplantation.
(e) Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) antibody positive.
(f) Neuropsychiatric disorder which could lead to
non-compliance or inhibit rehabilitation of the patient
(g) Pulmonary diseases:
(i) Cystic fibrosis.
(ii) Obstructive pulmonary disease (FEV1 less
than 50% of predictable).
(iii) Restrictive pulmonary disease (FVC less than
50% of predictable).
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DIVISION OF HEALTH
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Michael J. Deily
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PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL/
SEAN DAUGAARD
Petitioner
FINAL AGENCY ORDER
Case No. 98-033-47

vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING,
Respondent.

IF YOU ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH THIS DECISION, YOU MAY REQUEST A
RECONSIDERATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING
WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS AFTER THIS DECISION IS SIGNED. IF YOU WOULD
LIKE TO APPEAL THIS DECISION, YOU MAY FILE A PETITION IN THE UTAH
COURT OF APPEALS WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS AFTER THIS DECISION IS
SIGNED. IF YOU DECIDE TO APPEAL, YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO ASK FOR A
RECONSIDERATION FIRST, BUT YOU MAY DO SO IF YOU WISH. IF YOU HAVE
QUESTIONS, CALL (801) 538-6576.
The enclosed Recommended Decision has been reviewed pursuant to Section 63-46b-12
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, entitled "Agency Review - Procedure," and Department of
Health Administrative Rule R410-14, entitled "Division of Health Care Financing
Administrative Hearing Procedures for Medicaid/UMAP Applicants, Recipients, and
Providers."
I hereby adopt Recommended Decision No. 98-033-47 in its entirety.

RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
Within twenty (20) days after the date that this Final Agency Order is issued, you may file a
written request for reconsideration with the Director of the Division of Health Care Financing.
Any request for reconsideration must state the specific grounds upon which relief is requested.
The filing of such a request is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review.

EXHIBIT "A"

Judicial review may be secured by filing a petition in the Utah Coun of Appeals within thirty
(30) days of the issuance of this Final Agency Action or, if a request for reconsideration is
filed and denied, within thirty (30) days of the denial for reconsideration. The petition shall
be served upon the Director of Health Care Financing and shall state the specific grounds upon
which review is sought. Failure to file such a petition within the 30-day time limit may
constitute a waiver of any right to appeal the Final Agency Order.
A copy of this Final Agency Order shall be sent to Petitioner or representative at the last
known address by certified mail, return receipt requested.

DATED this

H

day of October 1998

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF^HEALTH
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BEFORE THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING

STATE OF UTAH
-00O00-

PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL/
SEAN DAUGAARD
Petitioner,
vs.

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE
FINANCING,

RECOMMENDED DECISION

Case No. 98-033-47
Margaret J. Clark
Administrative Law Judge

Respondent.

Pursuant to Rule R410-14 of the Utah Department of Health and the Utah Administrative
Hearing Procedures Act, Title 63, Chapter 46b, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, a
formal administrative hearing for the above captioned case was held on August 12, 1998. at
9:30 a.m., in Room 344, Cannon Health Building, 288 North 1460 West, Salt Lake City.
Utah 84116, Margaret J. Clark, Administrative Law Judge, presiding. The petitioner was
represented by David Erickson, Attorney at Law. The respondent was represented by Robert
Stewart, Staff Attorney for the Division of Health Care Financing (DHCF), Utah Depanment
of Health. Bernadette McNally and Richard Fairbourn testified on behalf of Primary
Children's Hospital ("PCMC").

ISSUE
WAS DHCF CORRECT IN DENYING REIMBURSEMENT TO PCMC FOR A BONE
MARROW TRANSPLANT FOR LACK OF PRIOR AUTHORIZATION?

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Sean was admitted to PCMC for preparation for a bone marrow transplant on July 8, 1997,
and for the transplant itself on July 17, 1997. Sean was discharged from PCMC on September
19, 1997.
2. On or about September 19, 1997, Dr. Ted Keyes, a treating physician of Sean's,
submitted a prior authorization request form on his behalf.
3. Richard Fairbourn, who worked as a resource counselor for PCMC in July 1997, had
worked with Sean's family in March 1997 to establish financial eligibility for Medicaid.
4. On July 9, 1997, the day after Sean was admitted to PCMC, his family had not received a
medical card for the month of July and one had not yet been issued.
5. When Mr. Fairbourn routinely checked the State's computer on July 9, 1997, he was
concerned when it appeared to him that Sean did not have Medicaid eligibility. At that time he
went to Debbie Lucero, a state eligibility worker at PCMC and asked her why Sean did not
have Medicaid eligibility.
6. Mr. Fairbourn asked Debbie Lucero how Sean could have a history of Medicaid eligibility
and then not show it on the States's eligibility computer on July 9, 1997.
7. In light of to Ms. Lucero's response that the case was in review status and needed a new
eligibility application, Mr. Fairbourn asked Sean's mother to complete a new eligibility
application. When it was completed, Mr. Fairbourn personally took it to Debbie Lucero and
handed it to her on July 9, 1997.
9. On July 9, 1997, Mr. Fairbourn. typed the following note into the hospital computer:
"PEND: NDCD APP with DEB [see Petitioner's Exhibit 3].
10. Mr. Fairbourn was not aware that Sean's eligibility status was confirmed later on July 9
and a letter so stating went out to the client on that date [see Respondent's Exhibit 10-4 ].
11. On August 1, 1997, when Mr. Fairbourn was routinely reviewing his accounts, he learned
for the first time that the State computer showed Medicaid eligibility for Sean for July and
August.
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12. On August 1, 1997, Mr. Fairbourn typed the note into the hospital computer: "CAID
ELIG FOR D.O.S." so employees at PCMC could have access to that knowledge.
13. Debbie Lucero normally informed Mr. Fairbourn when cases become eligible. Although
Ms. Lucero knew this case involved a large amount of money, she failed to inform Mr.
Fairbourn of Sean's eligibility.
14. The prior authorization request form was signed on September 19, 1997, and received by
DHCF on 10-29-97 [see Respondent's Exhibit 11].

RECOMMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. I recommend that denial of reimbursement for Sean Daugaard's bone marrow transplant be
AFFIRMED because there is nothing in the record to indicate Ms. Lucero had an affirmative
duty to keep PCMC apprised of new eligibility approvals, although that had been her custom.
Having known the financial impact of this case, PCMC was not diligent in following through
with tracking eligibility status.
2. Based upon the hearing record as a whole, including PCMC's lack of diligence in tracking
the eligibility and filing the prior authorization request, does not rise to the level of unusual
circumstances or equitable estoppel.

REASONS FOR PRESIDING OFFICER'S DECISION
Petitioner contended that on July 9, 1997, Medicaid eligibility for July had not been
authorized.
Petitioner also contended that the pertinent part of the transplant rule R410-10A-4(5), which
pertains to prior authorization is ambiguous. That section states:
Post transplant authorization for transplantation services provided under
unusual, emergency circumstances may be given [when all other criteria are
met]; emphasis added.
Petitioner contended that with the comma between unusual and emergency circumstances, a
reasonable reading would be to consider the meaning to be "unusual OR emergency
3

circumstances."
Finally the petitioner argued that the state should be estopped from now saying that PCMC
should have sent in a prior authorization request form.
Respondent contended that there was never a break in Sean's medical eligibility and that this
should have been obvious to PCMC.
Mr. Stewart stated in his opening argument that the State had previously suspended prior
authorization requirements "when a provider was unaware that a patient was going to be a
Medicaid recipient, and in doing so DHCF had followed R410-10A-4(5) which allows post
transplant authorization "under unusual, emergency circumstances" circumstances [Tr. at 15].
Mr. Stewart distinguished that situation from the current case because Sean had a history of
Medicaid eligibility and contended, therefore, that it was unreasonable for PCMC not to make
more affirmative efforts to learn of Sean's financial eligibility.
Petitioner contended that the elements of estoppel set forth in Eldredge v. Utah State
Retirement Bd.. 795 P2d 671 (Ct. App. 1990) were met and PCMC's actions were reasonably
prudent and diligent in processing the prior authorization request.
In the Eldredge case, Mr. Eldredge, a county employee, received conflicting information on
whether he could retire after a certain number of years without having to purchase previous
years from when he had worked for the county at an earlier time. The Utah Coun of appeals
sets forth the elements of the doctrine of estoppel as follows:
As a general rule under case law, the doctrine of estoppel is not assertable against the
state and its agencies [citations omitted]. Utah courts have, however, carved out an
exception to this general common law rule in unusual circumstances "where it is plain
that the interests of justice so require [citations omitted]. In cases where such an issue
arises, the critical inquire is whether it appears that the facts may be found with such
certainty, and the injustice to be suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the
exception [citations omitted].
The Court of Appeals then set forth in Eldredge the elements:
The elements essential to invoke inequitable estoppel are: (1) a statement,
admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later
asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis
of the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to
the second party that would result from allowing the first party to contradict or
repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to act [citations omitted].
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Based upon the evidence in the hearing record as a whole, the facts of this case do not meet all
of the elements of government estoppel or the "unusual circumstances" referred to in Utah
Administrative Rule R410-10A-4(5). Based upon the fact that PCMC had prior knowledge of
the patient's Medicaid and did not follow up on the status of a case with this much of a
financial impact, it is difficult to determine that PCMC's actions were entirely reasonable or
that the injustice to be suffered is of sufficient gravity to invoke the exception.
RECOMMENDED AGENCY ACTION
Wherefore, based upon the evidence in the formal hearing record as a whole, the presiding
officer concludes that DHCF's decision to deny authorization for lack of prior authorization
for Sean's bone marrow transplant be AFFIRMED.

.?/

DATED this c * / day of September 1998

Margz
Administrative Law Judge
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UMU-1080-98-U
CERTIFIED MAIL

July 23, 1998
Ted W. Keyes, M.D.
Blood and Bone Marrow Transplant Program
University of Utah School of Medicine
50 North Medical Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84132
Re: Sean Daugaard
Medicaid # 0302605602
SUBJECT:

AMENDED NOTICE OF DENIAL DUE TO LACK OF
SUBSTANTIATION OF MEDICAID CRITERIA

Dear Dr. Keyes:
This letter is to advise you Medicaid denies your request for funding for bone marrow
transplantation for the above-mentioned client. The following critena have not been
met:
The following rules and criteria are applicable*
R414-10A-6 Prior Authorization
1) Prior Authorization Request
R414-10A-6(1): Pncr authorization is required for all transplantation services
except for cornea and kidney transplantation.

awwf %

Ted W. Keyes, M.D.
July 23, 1998
Page 2

Prior authorization was not requested before the transplantation was
performed.
Sincerely,

Ann G. Petersen, R.N., M.S.
Health Program Manager
Bureau of Coverage and Reimbursement Policy
Enclosure: Request For A Hearing focm
cc:

Parents of Sean Daugaard
4625 North Woodenshoe Road
Kamas, UT 84061

NRS/bh
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Addendum D

Page: 1 Document Name: . .147

NOHI
NOTICE HISTORY
12AUG98 09:59
NOTICE NUMBER: MMAA
ANA G
CASE NAME: DAUGAARD, JENNIFER D
CASE NUMBER: 00280190
PROGRAM: DM BENEFIT MONTH: MAR97 DATE PRINTED: 0 9JUN97
FROM: LUCERO, DEBBIE E

YOUR APPLICATION FOR MEDICAID ASSISTANCE, DATED APRIL
WAS APPROVED ON 09 JUN 1996.

11, 1997,

YOUR MEDICAL COVERAGE BEGAN ON MARCH
01, 1997. YOU WILL RECEIVE A
MEDICAL CARD IN THE MAIL. IT WILL LIST THE NAMES AND I.D. NUMBER OF
ALL HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS WHO RECEIVE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE. YOU MUST SHOW
THIS CARD TO THE DOCTOR, PHARMACY, OR HOSPITAL TO GET MEDICAL
COVERAGE.
YOUNG CHILDREN AND PREGNANT WOMEN MAY BE ELIGIBLE FOR SUPPLEMENTAL
FOOD FROM THE WIC PROGRAM. FOR INFORMATION CALL 1-800-662-3638 OR
CONTACT YOUR LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENT.
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS NOTICE, PLEASE CALL US AT
SCREEN

1

OF

2

'=>:4":fi:(v

i

.Date: 8/12/98 Time: 10:03:08 AM
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TO DISPLAY MORE RECORDS PRESS ENTER
CASE ACTION LOG

CASE NUMBER: 00280190
ACTION

DATE

12AUG98 10:06
WORKER: ANA G
CASE NAME: DAUGAARD, JENNIFER D

WORKER NAME

DEPT/REG/OFF

3 0OCT97
ANITA
L HALL
HCS
RECEIVED BANK VERIFICATION AND POSTED ASSET AND INCOME INFORMATION
FOR OCTOBER REVIEW. FOUND ELIGIBLE.
AUTH DM FOR NOV AND DEC.
140CT97
ANITA
L HALL
HCS
REVIEW RECEIVED FOR THE CLIENT. IT IS NOT SIGNED, NOR IS THERE VERIF.
OF ASSET VALUE FOR BANK ACCOUNT.
THIS DATE I SENT ALIR TO CLIENT
09JUL97
DEBBIE
E LUCERO
HOP
CLIENT CAME IN NO CARD FOR JULY 97. AUTH JULY 97 CARD CLIENT REPORTED
SPOUSE NOT WORKING DID NOT REMOVE INCOME DOES NOT EFFECTIVE ELIG.
09JUN97
DEBBIE
E LUCERO
HOP
I HAVE RECD ALL NEEDED TO DO THIS DM. I HAD A HARD TIME GETTING THE INCOM
FROM THE EMPLOYER HE IS A CONSTRUCTION WORKER AND DOES HIS OWN BOOKS.
11APR97
DEBBIE
E LUCERO
HOP
I HAVE RECD AP HERE AT PCMC GAVE 124

SEARCH DATE

Date: 3/12/98 Time: 10:10:21 AM
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ORIGINAL CLAIM
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TCN: 97275211000021300 CAT-SVC: 01 ,CYCLE:
AID TYPE: A5
FUND: A
CLM-STAT: N DENIED
RECIPIENT-ID*: 0302605602 D/E-NAME: DAUGA SEAN
NB:

BTH-DT:

05/26/92

SEX:

M

AGE: 005

6

CLERK: 000 LOC:
CCF
MED-REC-NUM: 384679295
NAME: MCCAULEY
SEAN

PROV-TYP:

,01

PROV-NUM:

942854058

OTHER-INS: N ESPDT:
FAMILY-PLAN:
AUTO-ACCID: N OTHER-ACCID: N EMPLOYMENT
PRIOR-AUTH:
P/A IND:
REF-LIC#:
ATT-PHYS: 87176
ADMIT-LIC#:
ADMIT-DATE: 07/08/97
ADMIT-HOUR: 08
ADMIT-TYPE: 1
BEGINNING-DATE-OF-SERVICE: 07/08/97
ENDING-DATE-OF-SERVICE: 09/19/97
ICD-9-CM 1: 20500 2: 99685 3: 00845 4: 2761 5: 2848
ACCIDENT-DATE:
SURG-LIC-NUM: 10797 SURG-PROC-1: 4103
SURG-PROC-2: 0331
SURG-PROC-3: 413
SURG -DAfST^TTr^T/l 7/97 SURG-DATE-2: 07/08/97 SURG-DATE-3: 07/08
INELIG-DAYS: 000
OUTLIER-DAYS-APPROVED: 000
NON-COV-DAYS: 000
COV-DAYS: 073
DATE-DISC: 09/19/97
DATE-DEATH:
STILL-A-PATIENT:
DISCHARGE-STATUS: C
CHILD-ABUSE:
SIGNATURE-IND : Y
BILLING-DATE: 10/02/97
BILLING-TYPE: 111 ATTACH-IND: N
INS-CO:
ADJ-RSN:
TCN-TO-CREDIT: 0 0000-000-000000 0
DATE-PAID: 10/03/97
WARRANT-NUM: 00000669344
REIMB-AMT:
.00
STRL-CONSENT-DATE:
INTERPRET-DATE:
CIRC-IND:
PAY-TO-PROV: 94 2854 058211
CCF-SENT-DATE:
CO-PAYMENT-AMT:
DRG-CODE: 481
00 345 5 000
00 342 4 000
00 704 5 000
00 495 3 000
00 596 2 000
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